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What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme
Court's Evolving Seventh

Amendment Jurisprudence
Margaret L. Moses*
Introduction
In the United States, there are two very different views of the value of
the civil jury. The first is that the civil jury is a cornerstone of democratic
government, a protection against incompetent or oppressive judges, and a
way for the people to have an active role in the process of justice.' The second is that civil juries are inefficient, unpredictable, swayed by synpathy, and
incompetent to decide complex cases. 2 Regardless of the viewpoint held by
any particular group, the ability to expand or contract the right to a jury trial
has been limited by the constitutional mandate in the Seventh Amendment
and in most state constitutions that the right to jury trial must be preserved.
Theoretically at least, a constitutionally based mandate cannot be changed by
decisions of legislatures or judges. Nonetheless, the parameters of the jury
trial right have changed over time, generally, although not exclusively, in the
direction of restricting the jury's role. Continuing in that direction, a recent
Supreme Court case, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,3 sets forth a
test for determining the jury trial right under the Seventh Amendment which,
if followed to its logical conclusion, would dangerously dilute any constitutional guarantee of the right. As this Article discusses, the analysis found in
Markman differs in substantial respects from the Supreme Court's traditional
analysis of the Seventh Amendment guarantee. More recent Supreme Court
decisions, however, suggest that Markman's impact may be quite limited.
This Article examines the Supreme Court's evolving Seventh Amendment jurisprudence by focusing on the four strands that have emerged primarily in the twentieth century: first, the historical test of the right to a jury
trial, based upon whether the action could have been brought in a court of
law in 1791, the time of the Seventh Amendment's ratification; second, the
preservation of the "substance" of the jury trial right, as opposed to mere
matters of pleading and practice; third, the preservation of the jury right after
law and equity courts were merged in 1938; and fourth, the creation of an
exception to the Seventh Amendment guarantee for matters which Congress
has delegated for decision to non-Article III courts and administrative
agencies.
*
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1 See JoHN GU1NrHER, THE JURY IN AMElICA xiii-xxviii (1988).
2 See the discussion of jury criticisms in STEPHEN DjAimLs & JoANNE MARTn,
JuRIEs AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM 4-17 (1995).

3 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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These four strands provide the background and context for an analysis
of recent Supreme Court decisions concerning the jury trial right, in particular the decision of Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. In Markman, the
Supreme Court unanimously decided that the construction of patent claims
by the judge rather than the jury, including determination of all underlying
terms of art, did not violate the Seventh Amendment. 4 The effect of
Markman was to remove from the jury disputed issues of material fact which
may arise in connection with the construction of a patent claim. An important question raised by Markman is whether it signals a substantial change in
the Court's Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, or whether its impact will
merely be limited to the patent law area. It is the thesis of this Article that
Markman does not foretell a new era in Seventh Amendment jurisprudence.
Although the Markman analysis differs from traditional Seventh Amendment jurisprudence in a number of critical respects, a comparison with each
of the four strands indicates that a partial explanation for the Court's decision may derive from the fourth strand of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. The Court's deference to congressional goals for the federal patent
system, as well as its respect for the expertise of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit"), which was created by Congress to
function, inter alia, as the exclusive appellate court for patent cases, may help
explain the Court's willingness to create an exception in Markman to the
strong federal policy favoring jury trials. 5 As such, the application of Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence found in Markman will likely have little significance outside the area of patent law. Post-Markman decisions of the Court
6
appear to support this thesis.
Part I of this Article describes the background of the Seventh Amendment, including the emergence of the historical test for the right to a jury
trial. This historical background sets the stage for the discussion in Part II of
the four strands of twentieth-century Seventh Amendment jurisprudence.
Part III then outlines the Markman decision and compares it with the four
strands of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. Part IV concludes that
Markman should have little impact upon the Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial outside the area of patent law. Part V discusses the continuing
evolution of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence in three post-Markman decisions: Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,7 Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.,8 and City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes.9

4 See id. at 372. In this Article, for the sake of simplicity, I use the terms "judge" and
"court" to mean determiner of law, rather than trier of fact, in a non-jury trial. Such usage is
helpful because this Article addresses the proper allocation of an issue between judge and jury,
and not between judge as trier of fact and judge as determiner of law.
5 See infra Part IV.

6
7
8
9

See
520
523
119

infra Part V.
U.S. 17 (1997).
U.S. 340 (1998).
S. Ct. 1624 (1999).
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I.

ConstitutionalRequirements

Both the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and forty-eight
state constitutions provide for the right to a civil jury trial.10 Although the
Seventh Amendment has never been applied to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in any case based on state law
but brought in federal court either because of diversity of citizenship, or as a
state claim pendent to a federal claim, the civil jury trial right is determined
by the Seventh Amendment."
A.

Background of the Seventh Amendment

One objection raised during the Philadelphia Convention regarding the
U.S. Constitution as originally drafted was that it did not provide a right to a
civil jury trial.' 2 That criticism may ultimately have led to the adoption of the
entire Bill of Rights. 13 To rally opposition to the Constitution, antifederalists
used an exclusio unius argument, asserting that the absence of any civil jury
trial right in the proposed Constitution meant that the right had been abolished.' 4 Federalists responded that the only reason the Constitution did not
10 The Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of common law." U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
In the two states where the civil jury right is not constitutionally based, it is nonetheless
provided either by statute or court rule. The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides a right
to a civil jury trial, with certain exceptions such as in suits against a state agency or certain suits
to enforce an unconditional obligation for a specific sum of money. See LA. CODE CIv. PROC.
ANN. arts. 1731, 1732 (West 1990). In Colorado, the right to a civil jury trial is regulated by Rule
38 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, which is promulgated by the Supreme Court of
Colorado pursuant to its state constitutional rulemaking power. See COLO. R. Civ. P. 38; Setchell v. Dellacroce, 454 P.2d 804, 806 (Colo. 1969) (en banc).
11 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1973) (stating that "[tihe Court has not held that the right to jury trial in civil cases is an element of due
process applicable to state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment"); Simler v. Conner, 372
U.S. 221, 222 (1962) (holding that "the right to a jury trial in the federal courts is to be determined as a matter of federal law in diversity as well as other actions"); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec.
Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537-40 (1958) (holding that federal policy favoring jury decisions of
disputed fact questions should not yield to contrary state rule). For the most part, the traditional
common law analysis of whether a particular case is entitled to a jury trial is similar under state
or federal law. See Bruce D. Greenberg & Gary K. Wolinetz, The Right to a Civil Jury Trial in
New Jersey, 47 RuTGERS L. REv. 1461, 1501 n.224 (1995).
12 See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REv. 639, 657 (1973).
13 Wolfram asserts that "the entire issue of the absence of a bill of rights was precipitated
at the Philadelphia Convention by an objection that the document under consideration lacked a
specific guarantee of jury trial in civil cases." Ild. at 657; see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
439 U.S. 322, 339-43 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (providing a brief historical background of
the Seventh Amendment).
14 See Wolfram, supra note 12, at 672 n.89; see also Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 152
(1973). The Constitution does provide for the right to a jury trial in a criminal case. See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
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refer to the right was that the different states had such varied practices with
respect to the jury it was impossible to draft language to cover all situations.15
The antifederalists who used the absence of a Bill of Rights, including
lack of a civil jury trial right, as a basis for opposing the adoption of the
Constitution advanced a number of arguments in favor of a civil jury trial
right. Antifederalists were deeply concerned about protecting debtor defendants. They believed that new federal court judges would favor creditors,
who were more likely to be members of the judges' own class, as opposed to
debtors, who were more likely to be members of the lower classes. 16 Antifederalist Judge Samuel Bryan argued that civil juries are crucial because
judges are likely to have
"a bias towards those of their own rank and dignity; for it is not to
be expected, that the few should be attentive to the rights of the
many. This [the civil jury trial] therefore preserves in the hands of
the people, that share which they ought to have in the administration of justice, and prevents
the encroachments of the more power17
ful and wealthy citizens.'
Other arguments advanced by antifederalists in favor of civil jury trials
included the need to guard against unwise legislation, presumably by jury
nullification, the need to overturn the practices of courts of vice-admiralty, by
which the British had imposed non-jury proceedings on the colonists, the
protection of the interests of private citizens against the government, and the
protection of individuals against "overbearing and oppressive judges."18
These arguments had widespread popular appeal and ultimately carried
the day. The actual language of the Seventh Amendment, however, is remarkably unspecific, no doubt the result of a political process that would
tolerate only broad language in order to obtain approval. 19
The Founders left the delineation of the scope and content of the Seventh Amendment right to future court decisions. 20 In the intervening two
hundred years, judicial decisions have provided increasingly specific interpretations of the right. The courts have not always, however, provided a clear
and consistent method of determining the parameters of the Seventh
Amendment guarantee. Nonetheless, certain approaches to interpreting the
Seventh Amendment guarantee have been developed and repeated over time
to form the four distinct strands of jurisprudence discussed below.
15 See Wolfram, supra note 12, at 665; see also GEORGE

ANASTAPLO,

THE AMENDMENTS

13-14 (1995).
16 See Wolfram, supra note 12, at 673.

TO THE CONSTriuTION, A COMMENTARY

17 Id. at 695-96 (quoting Letters of Centinel, No. II, FREEMAN'S J., Oct. 24, 1787, reprinted
in PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSnrrurlON, 1787-1788, at 584 (John Bach McMaster &

Frederick D. Stone eds., Lancaster, Historical Soc'y of Pa. 1888)).
18 Id. at 670-71.
19 Another reason why the Seventh Amendment was drafted in general terms was the

significant diversity of practice among the various states. See Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARv. L. Rev. 289, 336 (1966).
20 See Wolfram, supra note 12, at 730 ("The skeletal nature of the record [of the Seventh
Amendment's adoption] hardly affords reassurance in its interpretation.").
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B. Emergence of the HistoricalTest
Throughout the last two hundred years, courts have struggled with the
simple language given us by the Founders: "In Suits at common law.., the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved. '21 Courts have had to flesh out the
meaning of the language of the Seventh Amendment in order to determine
its applicability. Did "[s]uits at common law" mean the common law of the
United States, the common law of England, or both? Did the phrase mean
suits brought at law rather than in equity or admiralty? Did the reference to
the common law mean the common law at one point in time, or the common
law as it develops over time? In other words, is the right to a jury trial a
static concept or is it a dynamic, changing concept? In the declaration that
"the right of trial by jury shall be preserved," was the right to be preserved
one of form as well as content? One of procedure as well as substance? Answers found in Seventh Amendment jurisprudence have not always been
consistent, sometimes contributing to a sense that the Seventh Amendment,
and the "historical test" of its applicability, tend to change color and form
with each new generation. Thus, the task of trying to distill the essence of the
Seventh Amendment is a daunting one. An examination of interpretations
of the amendment over two centuries, however, demonstrates that some patterns have emerged and some constants have taken shape.
Because the first clause of the Seventh Amendment provides that the
right to jury trial shall be preserved "in suits at common law," courts have
had to decide what was meant by "the common law." In Parsons v. Bedford, Justice Story determined that the term "suits at common law" in the
Seventh Amendment was meant to include all suits which were not in equity
or admiralty. 23 Until the early part of the twentieth century, this simple test
sufficed to determine when there would be a jury trial right. Nineteenthcentury judges had no apparent difficulties in distinguishing actions at law
from actions in equity or admiralty.
It was not until the twentieth century that courts developed a more elaborate test of what must be "preserved" under the Seventh Amendment. The
"historical test," frequently relied upon by courts in the second half of the
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
23 Justice Story wrote:
The phrase "common law," found in this clause [the Right to Jury Trial Clause], is
used in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence....
When, therefore, we find that the amendment requires that the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved in suits at common law, the natural conclusion is, that this distinction [between law and equity] was present to the minds of the framers of the
amendment. By common law, they meant what the constitution denominated in

21

22

the third article "law;" not merely suits, which the common law recognized among
its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained
and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were
recognized, and equitable remedies were administered .... In a just sense, the
amendment then may well be construed to embrace all suits which are not of equity

and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights.
Id. at 446-47.
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twentieth century, was first set forth in 1935, in Baltimore & CarolinaLine,
Inc. v. Redman.24 In that case, the Court declared that "[t]he right of trial by
jury thus preserved is the right which existed under the English common law
when the Amendment was adopted."25 There are two parts to the Court's
test in Redman: (1) the right to jury trial is that right which was provided
under English common law, and (2) the date for measuring that right is 1791,
the year the Seventh Amendment was adopted. 26 Although these two elements were only first set forth together in 1935, Charles Wolfram describes
the historical test as having a much earlier origin:
For at least the past century and a half, judicial and academic writings on the right to jury trial afforded by the seventh amendment
have uniformly agreed on one central proposition: in determining
whether the seventh amendment requires that a jury be called to decide the case the court must be guided by the practice of English
courts in 1791. If a jury would have been impaneled in this kind of
case in 1791 English practice, then generally a jury is required by
27
the seventh amendment.
The historical test has certainly been described in this manner, but its
establishment did not occur until the twentieth century. The test's development also followed a much less clear and certain path than one might think
from reading the above passage. Part of the confusion about the historical
test stems from the existence of two separate and distinct clauses in the Seventh Amendment. The first clause, known as the Right to Jury Trial Clause,
has a different jurisprudential history and interpretation than the second
clause, commonly known as the Re-Examination Clause. 28 The Supreme
Court has, on a number of occasions, asserted that the two clauses are distinct and independent, yet the interpretive history of one clause has sometimes been indiscriminately applied to the other.2 9 A number of twentieth24 295 U.S. 654 (1935); see also Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 482 (1935). Decided a few
months before Redman, Dimick referred to practices in England "at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution," and also stated that to ascertain the meaning of the Seventh Amendment,

"resort must be had to the appropriate rules of the common law established at the time of the
adoption of that constitutional provision in 1791." Dimick, 293 U.S. at 476,482. The decision in
Redman, handed down five months later, provided a clearer statement of the basic formula for
the "historical test" which was carried forward, with some modifications, for the rest of the
century. See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 348 (1998); Wooddell v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93, 97 (1991); Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564 (1990); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S.
412,417-18 (1986). The term "historical test" probably first appeared in 1918. See Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure,31 HARv. L. REv. 669, 671 (1918).
25 Redman, 295 U.S. at 657.
26 See id
27 Wolfram, supra note 12, at 639-40 (emphasis added).
28 The Right to Jury Trial Clause guarantees that "[i]n Suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."
U.S. CONsT. amend. VII. The Re-Examination Clause provides that "no fact tried by a jury,

shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of
the common law." ME
29 In Parsonsv. Bedford, Justice Story, after first discussing the Right to Jury Trial Clause,
referred to the Re-Examination Clause as follows: "But the other clause of the amendment is
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century decisions, discussing the right to a jury trial, have claimed that the
right was based solely on English law, citing Justice Story's 1812 decision in
United States v. Wonson.30 In Wonson, however, Justice Story dealt only with
31
the Re-Examination Clause, and not with the Right to Jury Trial Clause.
Nineteenth-century cases discussing the jury trial right and other constitutional issues, on the other hand, either rejected the common law of England
as controlling,32 did not refer to the common law of England at all,3 3 or referred to the common law and practice in both countries2 4 The source of the
claim that English common law alone determines the scope of the jury trial
still more important; and we read it as a substantial and independent clause." Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830). In Colgrove v. Battin, the Court noted that with respect to
the Re-Examination Clause,
[t]he reference to "common law" contained in the second clause of the Seventh
Amendment is irrelevant to our present inquiry because it deals exclusively with
the prohibition contained in that clause against the indirect impairment of the right
of trial by jury through judicial re-examination of factfindings of a jury other than
as permitted in 1791.
Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 152 n.6 (1973). More recently, in Gasperiniv. Centerfor Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996), the Court, in holding that a New York law controlling compensation awards for excessiveness can be given effect in federal court without offending the
Seventh Amendment, noted the separate functions of the two different clauses:
The Seventh Amendment... bears not only on the allocation of trial functions
between judge and jury, the issue in Byrd; it also controls the allocation of authority to review verdicts, the issue of concern here .... Byrd involved the first Clause
of the Amendment, the "trial by jury" Clause. This case involves the second, the
"re-examination" Clause.
Id. at 432. See Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309 (1920), for an example of indiscriminate
reference to the two clauses.
30 28 F. Cas. 745, 748 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750). Justice Brandeis, for example, in
Peterson, incorrectly cites Wonson, a Re-Examination Clause case, for the proposition that "[t]he
right to a jury trial guaranteed in the federal courts is that known to the law of England, not the
jury trial as modified by local usage or statute." Peterson, 253 U.S. at 309 n.1. The second case
Justice Brandeis cited, Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899), deals with both the Right
to Jury Trial Clause and the Re-Examination Clause, but does not support Justice Brandeis's
statement because it cites both English and American law as authority. See id. at 8-22.
31 In Wonson, Justice Story, as a circuit justice, had to decide whether an appeal from a
judgment on jury verdict below raised only questions of law, or whether the facts were to be
submitted to a second jury in the circuit court. See Wonson, 28 F. Cas. at 745. Justice Story's
dilemma arose from a Massachusetts practice to have a second jury at the appellate level. See id.
at 748. The United States, as appellant, argued that although the case was in federal court, the
government was entitled to another jury trial at the circuit level, because this was the practice in
the state courts of Massachusetts. See id. It was in this context that Justice Story ruled that the
common law referred to in the Re-Examination Clause was the common law of England, rather
than the common law of any individual state. See id. He noted that the common law probably
differed in each individual state, but all based their common law on the law of England. See id.
Justice Story also noted, however, that the practice of having a second jury on appeal, in Massachusetts and other New England states, is "a privilege existing by statute, and not by common
law," and that it appeared to be "a peculiarity in New England." Id.
32 See Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 458-61 (1847); discussion infra notes 47-55
and accompanying text.
33 See Parsons,28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 441-58.
34 See CapitalTraction, 174 U.S. at 8, 13, 15, 23 (referring to the common law of England
for Re-Examination Clause purposes, but to the common law of both England and the United
States for Right to Jury Trial Clause purposes).
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right appears to be a 1918 article by Austin Wakeman Scott.35 In his article,
Professor Scott declared that "[i]n determining what is meant by trial by jury
under the Seventh Amendment, inasmuch as the practice was different in the
different colonies, the federal courts look to the common law of England
rather than to the law of any particular colony. '3 6 Yet the three federal cases
cited by Scott as authority for this proposition, Thompson v. Utah,3 7 Capital
Traction Co. v. Hof,38 and Maxwell v. Dow, 3 9 provide no such support. Both
Thompson and Maxwell were criminal cases and do not provide authority for
40
interpreting the civil jury trial right under the Seventh Amendment.
Although Capital Traction was a civil case, the Court looked not only to the
41
common law of England, but to that of the United States as well.
Two years after Professor Scott's article appeared, however, Justice
Brandeis, in Ex parte Peterson,wrote the first Supreme Court decision asserting the civil jury trial right was that "known to the law of England. '42 Nonetheless, in support of the decision in Ex parte Peterson, Justice Brandeis cited
43
practices in both England and the American colonies.
The use of 1791, the time of ratification of the Seventh Amendment, as
part of the historical test, was also a twentieth-century development. In the
1898 Supreme Court decision of Thompson v. Utah, the Court first referred
35 See Scott, supra note 24, at 671.
(citations omitted).
37 170 U.S. 343 (1898), overruled on unrelatedgroundsby Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S.
37, 51-52 (1990).
38 174 U.S. 1 (1899).
39 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
40 See Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 582; Thompson, 170 U.S. at 344. "Only civil cases can serve as
direct evidence of the contemporary understanding of the seventh amendment." Henderson,
supra note 19, at 320. Henderson discusses criminal cases, however, to show how observations
about criminal cases sometimes were erroneously applied to civil cases. See id. at 320-35.
41 Although the Court in Capital Traction states at one point that the common law means
the common law of England, the reference is clearly to the Re-Examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment, and not to the Right to Jury Trial Clause. See Capital Traction,174 U.S. at 2223. When the Court discusses the right to trial by jury, and "what conditions may be imposed
upon the demand of such a trial, consistently with preserving the right to it," the Court concludes
that "the judicial decisions and the settled practice in the several States are entitled to great
weight, inasmuch as the constitutions of all of them had secured the right of trial by jury in civil
actions." Id. at 23.
42 Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309 n.1 (1920). Interestingly, Justice Brandeis cites
Professor Scott's article in Peterson, but for a different point: that new devices may be used to
adapt the jury trial to present needs. See id. at 309-10 (citing Scott, supra note 24, at 669). In
support of his conclusion that the jury trial right is determined by the common law of England,
Brandeis cites Wonson, which only concerned the Re-Examination Clause of the Seventh
Amendment, and Capital Traction, which relied on both English and American common law.
See United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 748 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750); Capital
Traction, 174 U.S. at 23. Brandeis cited no other cases dealing with this point. See Peterson,253
U.S. at 309 n.1.
43 The issue in Peterson was whether the appointment of an auditor, whose role was to
simplify the issues before the jury, impermissibly interfered with the right to a jury trial. See
Peterson, 253 U.S. at 304-05. Because Justice Brandeis, in his decision, considered practices in
both the American colonies and in England, it is not apparent why he limited the applicable
antecedent of the jury trial right to English law. See id. at 309-10. Brandeis may have been
influenced by Professor Scott's article. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
36 Id.
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to a specific date as the appropriate reference point for determining whether
a right to a jury trial existed under the Sixth Amendment; but the Court used
the date of the Constitution's adoption in 1789 instead of the date of adoption of the amendments. 44 It was not until 1935, and the Dimick and Redman
decisions, that the Supreme Court first declared that the reference point for
determining the right to a45civil jury trial was 1791, the date of the Seventh
Amendment's ratification.
Thus, the historical test of the civil jury trial right, initially set forth in the
Redman case, appears to be of more recent vintage than has been suggested
by some commentators and court decisions. 46 Before the 1930s, courts did
not need a specific time reference, or a reference only to English law to understand what constituted a right to a jury trial. For over a century, courts
had a reasonably clear idea of the substance and scope of the jury trial right
by looking at the distinctions between cases tried at law and cases tried in
equity or admiralty. Thus, courts did not need to search for precise historical
analogues within English common law in 1791.
In fact, one nineteenth-century Supreme Court decision flatly rejected a
proposal to use the law of England at the time of the Constitution's adoption
for the purpose of determining the meaning of the admiralty jurisdiction
clause in the Constitution. In Waring v. Clarke,47 the issue concerned two
steamboats which collided on the Mississippi River. 48 The appellants argued
that the case was not within the admiralty jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States, and asserted that the grant in the Constitution of "'all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction' was limited to what were cases of admiour Revolutionary war beralty and maritime jurisdiction in England when
'49
gan, or when the constitution was adopted.
The Supreme Court rejected this view, holding unequivocally that "the
grant of admiralty power to the courts of the United States was not intended
to be limited or to be interpreted by what were cases of admiralty jurisdiction
in England when the constitution was adopted. ' 50 The Court also noted that
"[n]o such interpretation has been permitted in respect to any other power in
the constitution."151 Suggesting how ridiculous it would be for the constitutional power to be limited by English law, the Court gave as examples of this
absurdity the idea that the judicial power which extended "'to all cases af44 See Thompson, 170 U.S. at 350.
45 See Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935).
46 For example, Justice Souter asserted in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S.
370 (1996), that "[s]ince Justice Story's day, United States v. Wonson, we have understood that
'[t]he right of trial by jury thus preserved is the right which existed under the English common

law when the Amendment was adopted."' Id. at 376 (citations omitted). As noted earlier, Justice Story did not deal at all with the right to a jury trial in the Wonson decision, and the historical test described by Justice Souter was not fully formulated until 1935. See supra notes 30-45

and accompanying text.
47 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847).
See id. at 442-43.
Id. at 451-52 (quoting U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1).
50 Id. at 459.
51 Id. at 458.
48
49
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fecting ambassadors, other ministers, and consuls"' could be limited by English law, or that the grant to Congress "'to establish uniform laws on the
subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States"' could be limited by
the "bankrupt[cy] system of England as it existed there when the constitution
was adopted." 52 The Court stated quite forcefully: "Such a limitation upon
that clause we deny. We think we may very safely say, such interpretations of
any grant in the constitution, or limitations upon those grants, according to
'53
any English legislation or judicial rule, cannot be permitted.
Waring v. Clarke is perhaps helpful in understanding why nineteenthcentury Supreme Court decisions did not refer to the law of England as the
sole source for determining the constitutional right to a jury trial.5 4 That was
55
to change, however, in the twentieth century.
11. Modern Interpretationsof the Jury Trial Right
During the twentieth century, four strands of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence emerged. Part II.A traces the recent refinements to the historical
test, the first strand of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. The historical
test determines whether there exists a right to a jury trial in a particular type
of action. Once a right to a jury trial is found-to exist in an action, the parameters of the right within the cause of action must be determined. Part II.B
focuses on the second strand of jurisprudence, the substance of the jury trial
right. This part also considers the tension between the need to "preserve"
Id. (quoting U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, ci. 4; id. art. III, § 2, cl.
1).
Id. at 458-59.
There is, of course, some limited reference to the law of England as the common law
referred to in the Re-Examination Clause, specifically in the Wonson decision, as well as in
Capital Traction,decided at the end of the century. See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1,
8-22 (1899); United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 748 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750);
notes 30-31 and accompanying text. Wonson was a case decided not by the Supreme Court but
by Mr. Justice Story in the federal circuit court. See Wonson, 28 F. Cas. at 745. Professor Wolfram believes that there is little basis to assume that the use of the term "common law" in the
1789-91 period necessarily referred to England. He notes that even Mr. Justice Story in his
Wonson opinion did not deny that the language of the amendment could just as well have been
read to refer to the common law in the states as to the common law of England. See Wolfram,
supra note 12, at 734. Interestingly, in Parsonsv. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830), a number
of years later, Mr. Justice Story, writing then for the Supreme Court, did not at any point suggest
that the common law of England, as opposed to the common law of the American colonies,
should be the reference point for constitutional interpretation of either clause of the Seventh
Amendment. See id.
at 446-49.
55 Whether English or American law controls can make a difference. In In re Lockwood,
50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir.), vacated sub nom. American Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182
(1995), Judge Nies, in dissent, argued that issues of patent validity, including underlying facts,
should be determined by the judge rather than the jury. See id. at 981 (Nies, C.J., dissenting). In
support of her position, Judge Nies noted that a suit to repeal a patent is similar to a writ of scire
facias. See id. at 984 (Nies, C.J., dissenting). "Although writs of scire facias issued out of law
courts in early American courts, English courts issued such writs in courts of equity. The historical test requires courts to look to English practice in 1791, not American practice." Id. at 985 n.7
(Nies, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted). If one assumes Judge Nies was correct in her description of English and American practices, and in her comparison of a suit to repeal a patent with a
writ of scire facias, then following English practice in this case would lead to a bench trial, while
following American practice would lead to jury trial.
52
53
54
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the jury trial right and the need to adapt it to more modem times. Part ILC
discusses the development of the third strand of jurisprudence, which concerns the effect of the merger of the courts of law and equity on the jury trial
right. Finally, Part I.D considers the fourth strand-the exclusion of the
Seventh Amendment jury trial right from matters involving public rights
which Congress has assigned to non-Article III courts and administrative
adjudication.
A. Refinements to the Historical Test
Since the historical test was first announced in the Redman decision in
1935, cases have expanded and refined the test. In Curtis v. Loether 5 6 a fair
housing case in which the respondents sought a jury trial under the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, the Supreme Court declared that the Seventh Amendment applies not only to suits based on the common law, but also to statutory
causes of action.5 7 Citing Justice Story's view in Parsonsv. Bedford that the
Seventh Amendment embraces "'all suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction,"' the Court emphasized that "the Seventh Amendment ...appl[ies] to actions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury
trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforcea58
ble in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law."
Because a statutory action would have a jury trial right if an analogous
claim would have been tried in the law courts in 1791, courts soon began to
search for historical analogues to modem statutory causes of action. A few
months after the Curtis decision, in Pernell v. Southall Realty,59 an action to
recover possession of real property in the District of Columbia, the Court
undertook a review of the history of ejectment actions back to the twelfth
60
century to determine whether these actions were typically heard by juries.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had held that
the Seventh Amendment did not guarantee the right to a jury trial in the case
at bar-a statutory eviction action-because it found no equivalent at common law. 61 The Supreme Court determined, however, that although the statute did not resemble the common law action of ejectment in detail, it served
the same essential function by permitting a plaintiff to evict a person wrongfully in possession of property.62 Because the right to recover possession of
real property was a right protected at common law, the Court held that the
Seventh Amendment preserved the right to a jury trial in the statutory eviction action. 63 Citing Curtis v. Loether, the Court noted that the jury trial
right extended beyond the common law forms of action recognized in 1791.64
56
57
58
59
60

415 U.S. 189 (1974).
See id. at 193-94.
Id. (quoting Parsons,28 t?.S. (3 Pet.) at 447).
416 U.S. 363 (1974).
See id. at 371-74.

61 See id. at 374.

62 See id. at 375-76.
63 See id at 376.

64 See id. at 374 (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974)).
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Further, the Court emphasized the lack of importance of finding a close historical analogue:
Whether or not a close equivalent to [the statutory action] existed in
England in 1791 is irrelevant for Seventh Amendment purposes, for
that Amendment requires trial by jury in actions unheard of at common law, provided that the action involves rights and remedies of
the sort traditionally enforced in an action at law, rather than in an
action in equity or admiralty. 65
In 1987, the Supreme Court, in Tull v. United States,66 again emphasized
that finding an exact historical analogue is not required. The Court's task in
Tull was to decide if the Seventh Amendment guaranteed the right to a jury
trial to determine liability in an action brought by the government seeking
civil penalties and injunctive relief under the Clean Water Act. 67 The basic
test set forth by the Court was one "[t]o determine whether a statutory action
is more similar to cases that were tried in courts of law than to suits tried in
courts of equity or admiralty. ' '68 To accomplish this task, the Court determined that it must examine both the nature of the action and the remedy
sought.

69

The government opposed the jury trial right in Tull, arguing that the
nature of an action to obtain penalties under the Clean Water Act more
closely resembled an action to abate a public nuisance than an action in
debt. 70 The former action had no jury trial right in eighteenth-century English common law, while the latter action required a jury trial.71 The Court
said it did not need to decide whether the better analogy to the case at bar
was a public nuisance or an action in debt. 72 It found both to be appropriate
analogies, but cited with approval the statement in Pernell that the question
of "close equivalents" to eighteenth-century actions "'is irrelevant for Seventh Amendment purposes."' 73 The Court then stated that it need not rest
its conclusion on an "'abstruse historical"' search for the nearest eighteenthcentury analogue. 74 The Court emphasized that of the historical test's two
prongs, the remedy prong is far more important than the nature of the action
prong.75
65 Id. at 375.

66 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
67 See id at 414.
68 Id. at 417.

69 See id. "Hirst, we compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the
courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Second we examine the
remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature." Id. at 417-18 (citations
omitted).
70 See id. at 420.
71 See id.
72 See id&

73 Id. (quoting Pemell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 375 (1974)).
74 Id. at 421 (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970)).
75 See id. "We reiterate our previously expressed view that characterizing the relief sought
is '[m]ore important' than finding a precisely analogous common-law cause of action in determining whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial." Id. (quoting Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974) (alteration in original)).
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Focusing on the relief sought, which was the enforcement of a civil penalty, the Court found that this type of remedy at common law was enforced in
courts of law, and not in courts
of equity.76 Thus, there was a right to trial by
77
jury on the issue of liability.
From Curtis v. Loether through the Pernell and Tull decisions, there ap-

peared to be a consensus among the Justices that the search for a close historical analogue should be de-emphasized in determining whether there was a
right to a jury trial in a particular case.78 The Justices' focus, rather, was on
whether the kind of action brought would have been brought in a court of
law, with the most important factor being the nature of relief sought. 79
It was somewhat surprising, then, to see this consensus fall apart in 1990,
in Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry.80 The question
in Chauffeurs was whether employees seeking back pay for a union's alleged
breach of its duty of fair representation had a right to a civil jury trial.81 The
case involved two substantive issues: whether the employer's action violated
the terms of the collective bargaining agreements, and whether the union
breached its duty of fair representation. 82 The split among the Justices nonetheless produced a majority for each part of the decision except Part III-A,
which discussed the use of historical analogues. 83 A majority of Justices supported the two-prong test of Tull, ruling that there is a need to examine both
the nature of the issue and the remedy sought, and that the remedy sought is
the more important of the two prongs. 84 Only three Justices, however,
76 See id. at 422.
77 See id. at 425. "A civil penalty was a type of remedy at common law that could only be
enforced in courts of law." Id at 421. In Tull, however, the assessment of the amount of the
penalty was ultimately found to be matter for a judge. See id. at 427. In a more recent Supreme
Court decision, Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998), the Court distinguished Tull, finding that the jury rather that the judge must determine statutory damages
under section 504(c) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). See
Feltner,523 U.S. at 355; infra Part V.B.
78 In Curtis, the decision was unanimous. See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 189. In Pernell, two
Justices concurred in the result, but did not file separate opinions. See Pernell,416 U.S. at 385.
In Tull, Justice Scalia, with Justice Stevens, concurred in part, but dissented with respect to the
determination of relief. Tull, 481 U.S. at 427-28 (Scalia & Stevens, JJ., concurring and dissenting). He believed the amount of the civil penalty should also be determined by a jury. See id.
(Scalia & Stevens, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
79 See Tull, 481 U.S. at 421; Pernell,416 U.S. at 382. "[W]here the action involves rights
and remedies recognized at common law, it must preserve to parties their right to a jury trial."
Pernell, 416 U.S. at 382 (citing Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195).
80 494 U.S. 558 (1990). Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to
Parts I, II, III-B and IV, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Stevens joined, see id. at 561-65, 570-74, and an opinion with respect to Part Ill-A, in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Blackmun joined, see id. at 565-70 (plurality opinion). Justices Brennan and Stevens filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment. See id. at 574-81 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id.
at 581-84 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice Kennedy filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined. See id. at 584-95 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
81 See id. at 561.
82 See id. at 562.
83 See id. at 565-70 (plurality opinion).
84 See id. at 565.
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agreed with Justice Marshall's discussion in Part III-A on historical analogues.8 5 This Part considered whether in the eighteenth century an analogous cause of action to the duty of fair representation had existed, and if so,
whether that would determine if the nature of the suit at bar was legal or
equitable. 86 The union argued that there was no right to a jury trial in a duty
of fair representation case, because the action resembled either an action to
set aside an arbitration award or an action by a trust beneficiary against a
trustee for breach of fiduciary duty.87 The employees, on the other hand,
contended that the action was more akin to an attorney malpractice action,
which was historically an action at law.8 8 Justice Marshall concluded that the
action encompassed both equitable and legal issues, and that the first part of
the Seventh Amendment inquiry ended "in equipoise as to whether the [employees were] entitled to a jury trial. '8 9 In the next two parts of the opinion,
which garnered majority support, Justice Marshall determined that the second part of the inquiry, which focused on remedies, tipped the balance in
favor of recognizing a jury trial right.90 He concluded that "[a]lthough the
search for an adequate 18th-century analog revealed that the claim includes
both legal and equitable issues, the money damages respondents seek are the
type of relief traditionally awarded by courts of law. Thus, the Seventh
Amendment entitles respondents to a jury trial ....

91

The concurring and dissenting opinions made clear that the consensus
formed in earlier cases had dissolved over the question of the significance of
finding a close historical analogue. Justices Brennan and Stevens, filing separate concurring opinions, refused to join Part III-A because in their view it
overemphasized the historical approach. 92 Justice Brennan stated that using
200-year-old English forms of action to determine the right to a jury trial
"needlessly convolutes our Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. ' 93 Justice
Brennan would have decided the Seventh Amendment question solely on the
basis of the relief sought in the case. 94 If the relief was of the type historically
available in courts of law, Justice Brennan would have held that the parties
had "a constitutional right to a trial by jury." 95 Justice Brennan's concern
was that:
[A]ll too often the first prong of the current test requires courts to
measure modem statutory actions against 18th-century English actions so remote in form and concept that there is no firm basis for
85
86
87
88
89

See id. at 560, 565-70 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 566-70 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 566-68 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 568-69 (plurality opinion).
Id at 570 (plurality opinion).
90 See id. at 570-74.
91 Id. at 573-74.
92 See id. at 574 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id. at 581
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
93 Id. at 575 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).'
94 See id. at 574 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
95 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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comparison. In such cases, the result is less the discovery 96of a historical analog than the manufacture of a historical fiction.
In Justice Brennan's view, focusing on the relief sought by the parties
would produce a test that would be both more manageable and more reliable
from an historical perspective. 97
Like Justice Brennan, Justice Stevens felt that the Court exaggerated the
importance of finding a precise common law analogue to the duty of fair
representation, concluding that "the relevant historical question is not
whether a suit was 'specifically recognized at common law,' but whether 'the
nature of the substantive right asserted . . . is analogous to common law
rights' and whether the relief sought is 'typical of an action at law."' 9 8
While Justice Brennan contended that the first prong of the historical
test should be retired, and Justice Stevens thought the Court exaggerated its
importance, the dissenting Justices-O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy-disagreed with the majority because they believed the case should have turned
on finding the closest historical analogue.99 In their view, the equitable trust

action was an appropriate analogue for the modern duty of fair representation, and this should have been sufficient to decide there was no jury trial
right.100 The dissenting Justices acknowledged the remedy prong of the historical test to be of considerable importance, but emphasized that the Court
in Curtis had explicitly stated that it did not "'go so far as to say that any
award of monetary relief might necessarily be "legal" relief."" 0 ' The dissenting Justices further defended adherence to the historical test on the grounds
that it was required by the Constitution, concluding that because the Seventh
Amendment "'preserves' the right to jury trial in civil cases [and] [w]e cannot
2
preserve a right... unless we look to history to identify it."'
In Chauffeurs, the Court was deeply divided over the importance of using historical analogues to eighteenth-century English actions in determining
whether there was a right to a jury trial. Two Justices felt the search for an
historical analogue should be de-emphasized or abandoned. 0 3 Three Justices
thought that finding an historical analogue could be determinative, because
"'a single historical analog [can take] into consideration the nature of the
Id. at 579 n.7 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
97 See id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). As Justice Brennan noted, "[T]he nature of relief available today corresponds more directly to the nature of
relief available in Georgian England. Thus the historical test I propose, focusing on the nature
of the relief sought, is not only more manageable than the current test, it is more reliably
grounded in history." Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
98 Id. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (citations
omitted).
99 See id. at 584 (O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
100 See id. (O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
101 Id. at 591 (O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Curtis v. Loether,
415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974)).
102 Id. at 592 (O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
103 See id. at 574 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id. at 581
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
96
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cause of action and the remedy.'l4 Finally, four Justices thought that finding an historical analogue was worthy of inquiry, but where the matter was
not clearly determined by history, the remedy prong of the historical test
should be determinative. 10 5

Less than two years after the highly-fractured Chauffeurs decision, the
Court, in Wooddell v. InternationalBrotherhood of ElectricalWorkers, Local
71, decided unanimously that a union member who sued his local union for
money damages under Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959106 ("LMRDA") had the right to a jury trial. 10 7 Interestingly, the Court explained the decision in Chauffeurs as having turned on the
remedy prong of the test and did not mention the historical analogue prong
of the test.10 8 Moreover, after giving its standard recitation of the historical
test, the Court found no need to look for an historical analogue to determine
if the petitioner had a right to a jury trial.10 9 In a prior LMRDA case, the
Court had held, for purposes of establishing the appropriate statute of limitations, that actions under the LMRDA were closely analogous to personal
injury actions.110 The Court thus concluded in Wooddell that because "[a]
personal injury action is ... a prototypical example of an action at law, to
which the Seventh Amendment applies," the plaintiff was entitled to a jury
trial."'
The historical analogy, then, would appear to have significance only in
cases such as Chauffeurs where there is a serious question regarding whether
the closest historical analogue of the action is in equity or in law. But even in
such cases, as the Court explained in Wooddell, the remedy sought will be

determinative. 112
Thus, prior to the Markman decision in 1996, the Court appeared in its
Seventh Amendment decisions to be de-emphasizing the need to search for
an historical analogue, and to be placing primary emphasis on the remedy
sought as a means to determine the right to a jury trial.

104 Id. at 592 (O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Tull v. United
States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 n.6 (1987)).
105 See id. at 573-74 (plurality opinion).
106 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1994).
107 See Wooddell v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93, 98 (1991)
(deciding case without the participation of Justice Thomas).
108 See id. at 97.
109 See id. at 97-98.
To determine whether a particular action will resolve legal rights, and therefore
give rise to a jury trial right, we examine both the nature of the issues involved and
the remedy sought. "'First, we compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and
equity. Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or
equitable in nature."' The second inquiry is the more important in our analysis.
Id. at 97 (citations omitted).
110 See id at 98.
1"l Id.
112 See id. at 97. Explaining its decision in Chauffeurs, the Court said: "Because we found
that the damages sought were neither analogous to equitable restitutionary relief, nor incidental
to or intertwined with injunctive relief, we concluded that the remedy had none of the attributes
required for an exception to the general rule, and thus found the remedy sought to be legal." Id.
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Substance of the Right to a Jury Trial

The historical test is one means of determining whether parties to a particular action have the right to a jury trial. Once that right is established,
however, there remains the question of its scope. 113 Courts over the last two
hundred years have struggled with defining that scope while adapting the
civil jury trial right to the needs of changing times. Although the Supreme
Court has repeatedly asserted the need to "preserve" the jury trial right, it
has generally not felt constrained to limit what it refers to as the "incidents"
of the civil jury trial to procedures or practices which would have been followed in 1791.114 A necessary question, of course, is whether the permitted
changes in these practices have such an impact on the right to a jury trial that
they impinge upon the substance of the guarantee itself. To discern this, one
must first attempt to understand what the substance of the right is.
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court set forth its understanding of the substance of the Seventh Amendment guarantee. One of
the most cited early declarations of the substance of the jury trial right is
found in Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 115 a case
decided just before the turn of the century. The Court in Walker was asked
to determine whether an act of the Territory of New Mexico contravened the
Seventh Amendment by providing that a court could grant judgment on a
jury's special findings if the jury's general verdict was inconsistent with those
special findings. 116 The Court determined that courts could render judgment
in accordance with the special findings without offending the Seventh
Amendment.1 7 According to the Court, the Seventh Amendment
does not attempt to regulate matters of pleading or practice .... Its
aim is not to preserve mere matters of form and procedure but sub113 Eighteenth-century juries, for example, were considered to have the power to decide
both the law and the facts. In Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794), which involved an
action to determine priority between creditors, Chief Justice John Jay charged the jury, "as on
the one hand, it is presumed, that juries are the best judges of facts; it is, on the other hand,
presumable, that the court [is] the best judge[ ] of law. But still both objects are lawfully, within
your power of decision." Il at 4; see also Morris S. Arnold, A HistoricalInquiry into the Right to
Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 829, 833 (1980) (stating that "juries
in eighteenth-century America had much more power to decide questions both of law and fact
than do modem ones"). Professor Scott notes that by the time of the American Revolution,
English law already had established that juries decide questions of fact, while judges determine
questions of law. See Scott, supra note 24, at 677. In the American colonies, however, the resentment of Crown judges and the popular enthusiasm for trials by jury tended to result in
limitations on powers of American judges, and great latitude for juries. See id. Gradually, however, the jury's role shifted in the nineteenth century predominantly to that of fact-finder. See
WILLIAM E.

NELSON, AMERICANIZATION

OF THE COMMON LAW:

THE IMPACT OF LEGAL

1760-1830, at 165-74 (1975).
114 See, e.g., Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390 (1943) ("The [Seventh] Amendment did not bind the federal courts to the exact procedural incidents or details of jury trial
according to the common law in 1791, any more than it tied them to the common-law system of
pleading or the specific rules of evidence then prevailing."); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156
(1973) (citing with approval the above language from Galloway).
115 165 U.S. 593 (1897).
116 See id. at 594.
117 See id.
CHANGES ON MASSACHUSETrS SocIETY,
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stance of right. This requires that questions of fact in common law
actions shall be settled by a jury, and that the court shall not assume
directly or indirectly to take from the jury or to itself such
118
prerogative.
The substance that must be preserved, therefore, is the jury's role as finder of
fact. Matters of pleading and practice, according to the Walker decision, are
simply not regulated by the Seventh Amendment. Thus, a judge's grant of
judgment on a jury's special findings, when the special findings are inconsistent with the general verdict, does not intrude on the civil jury trial right.1 19
Justice Brandeis cited Walker with approval in 1920 in Ex parte Peterson,
where, writing for the majority, he found that appointing an auditor to make
120
tentative findings of fact does not deprive a party of the right to a jury trial.
Justice Brandeis expounded on the necessity of adapting the jury trial right in
light of change:
[The Seventh Amendment] does not prohibit the introduction of
new methods for determining what facts are actually in issue, nor
does it prohibit the introduction of new rules of evidence.... New
devices may be used to adapt the ancient institution to present
needs and to make of it an efficient instrument in the administration
of justice. Indeed, such changes are essential to the preservation of
the right. The limitation imposed by the Amendment is merely that
enjoyment of the right of trial by jury be not obstructed, and that the
ultimate determination of issues of fact by the jury not be interfered
12 1
with.
Consistent with the Walker decision, Justice Brandeis viewed changes in jury
procedures as necessary and non-violative of Seventh Amendment rights,
and concluded that the core of the Amendment's guarantee is the preservation of the jury's fact-finding function. 122
Later, in Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co.,123 the Court
found that the Seventh Amendment did not require following eighteenthcentury common law practices with respect to the grant of a partial new
trial.124 Although acknowledging that in similar circumstances Lord Mansfield would have.set aside the entire verdict if error was found as to one part,
the Court nonetheless held that no new trial was required on the petitioner's
claim, although the counterclaim would have to be retried. 25 Justifying a
different result from common law practice, the Court explained:
118 Id. at 596 (emphasis added).
119 See id. at 598.
120 Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309-12 (1920).
121 Id. at 309-10 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
122 See id. at 310 n.1 (citing Scott, supra note 24, at 669).
123 283 U.S. 494 (1931).
124 See id. at 497-98.
125 See id. at 498-500. Although the appellate court had directed a new trial only on the
issue of damages on the counterclaim, the Supreme Court held that this question was so interwoven with that of liability that both the counterclaim and damages determination would have to

be submitted to the jury in a new trial. The verdict in favor of the petitioner on the claim in
chief, however, did not have to be retried. See id. at 496, 498-501.

HeinOnline -- 68 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 200 1999-2000

2000]

What the Jury Must Hear

[W]e are not now concerned with the form of the ancient rule. It is
the Constitution which we are to interpret; and the Constitution is
concerned, not with form, but with substance. All of vital significance in trial by jury is that issues of fact be submitted for determination with such instructions and guidance by the court as will
afford opportunity for that consideration by the jury26which was secured by the rules governing trials at common law.'
Similarly, the Court in Galloway v. United States, 2 7 in ruling that the
directed verdict does not offend the Seventh Amendment, emphasized that
1791 practices are not controlling as long as the fundamental elements of the
jury trial right are preserved. 2 8 The Court traced the directed verdict's historical evolution from the common law nonsuit, noting the importance of
flexibility and change in jury trial practice. 2 9 "The Amendment did not bind
the federal courts to the exact procedural incidents or details of jury trial
according to the common law in 1791, any more than it tied them to the
common-law system of pleading or the specific rules of evidence then prevailing."130 Rather, the Court found that "the Amendment was designed to preserve the basic institution of jury trial in only its most fundamental elements,
not the great mass of procedural forms and details.' 131 Although the Court
in Galloway did not articulate what it thought the fundamental elements of
the jury trial were, it cited as authority such cases as GasolineProducts Co. v.
all of
Champlin Refining Co., Ex parte Peterson, and Walker v. New Mexico,
132
facts.
of
finder
the
as
role
jury's
the
fundamental
as
which defined
Even an element as seemingly fundamental as a jury composed of twelve
persons has not survived the adaptation to modern practices and procedures.
In Colgrove v. Battin,'1 33 the Court affirmed a lower court's decision that a
local district court rule permitting six rather than twelve persons to constitute
a jury does not violate the Seventh Amendment34 Despite earlier Supreme
Court decisions declaring that a twelve person jury is one of the fundamental
guarantees of the Seventh Amendment, and despite the common law practice in 1791 of juries of twelve, the Court determined that having twelve
members was not a substantive aspect of the right to a jury trial.' 35 It noted
126 Id. at 498.

127 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
128 See id. at 373, 392.
129
130
131

See id. at 388-96.
Id. at 390.

Id. at 392.
See id. at 390-91 n.22 (citing Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co, 283 U.S. 494,498
(1931); Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309-10 (1920); Walker v. New Mexico & S. Pac. R.R.
Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596-98 (1897)). The language from Galloway was quoted in ParklaneHosiery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), where the Court found that the use of offensive collateral
estoppel (with no mutuality of parties) did not violate the petitioner's Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial, even though mutuality of parties was required at common law. See id. at 336-37.
133 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
134 See id. at 159-60,
135 See id. at 158-60. But see Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899) (stating that
included in the right to a civil jury trial is the concept that "'[t]rial by jury,' in the primary and
usual sense of the term at the common law and in the American constitutions.., is a trial by a
jury of twelve men").
132
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that "the Framers of the Seventh Amendment were concerned with preserving the right of trial by jury in civil cases where it existed at common law,
rather than the various incidents of trial by jury."'1 36 The Court referred to its
earlier decision in Williams v. Florida,37 a criminal case, where it had rejected the notion that the reliability of a jury as fact finder is a function of its
size. 38 In the Court's view, the reduction in the number of jurors would not
impact upon the fundamental purpose of the jury trial right in a civil case:
1 39
"to assure a fair and equitable resolution of factual issues."'
These cases demonstrate that when the Court has approved changes to
the jury trial right, it has insisted that such changes must not undermine the
fundamental role of the jury to find facts. When the Court has not approved
such changes, its justification has also been that of protecting the role of the

jury to find facts. In Dimick v. Schiedt,140 the Court refused to approve the

practice of additur, which it said was not an established practice under the
common law.' 41 A trial court judge in a negligence case had ordered a new
trial unless the defendant would agree to an increase in damages. 142 The
Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that the judge's order violated the
Seventh Amendment right of trial by jury. 143 The Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the Court of Appeals, based on its view that additur would
interfere with the right of jury trial. 44 The Court distinguished the accepted
practice of remittitur by noting that reducing an excessive verdict is simply
"lopping off an excrescence."' 45 But, according to the Court, if a court increases a verdict that is too small, it is doing something that has never been
passed upon by the jury, and thereby brings "the constitutional right of the
plaintiff to a jury trial to an end in respect of a matter of fact."'1 46 The Court
made clear its respect for the civil jury trial right, noting that Blackstone
characterized it as "'the glory of the English law' and 'the most transcendent
privilege which any subject can enjoy."' 147 The Court went on to state, in
language that has been frequently quoted by other courts, its view of the
136 Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 155-56.
137 399 U.S. 78, 100-01 (1970) (finding a Florida statute that provides for a "six-man" jury
for noncapital criminal trials to be constitutional).
138 See Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 157-59 (citing Williams, 399 U.S. at 100-01).
139 Id. at 157.
140 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
141 See id. at 484-85.
142 See id. at 475-76.
143 See id. at 476.
144 See id. at 486-88.
145 Id. at 486.
146 Id. Curiously, the Court in ParklaneHosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1978), declared
that the holding in Dimick was that the use of additur violated the Re-Examination Clauseof the
Seventh Amendment. See ParklaneHosiery, 439 U.S. at 336. That was not the Dimick Court's

view. It specifically affirmed the holding of the court of appeals that the use of additur "violated
the Seventh Amendment of the Federal Constitution in respect of the right of trial by jury."
Dimick, 293 U.S. at 476. The trial court was not viewed as having re-examined a fact tried by a
jury. Rather, the trial court was making "a bald addition" of something not included in the
verdict, and therefore never passed upon by the jury. See id. at 486. Such an act by the lower
court violated the right to trial by jury. See id. at 486-87.
147 Dimick, 293 U.S. at 485 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379).
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importance of the jury as fact finder: "Maintenance of the jury as a factfinding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history
and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial
should be scrutinized with the utmost care.'
A "seeming curtailment" of the jury trial right nonetheless took place in
Tull v. United States.149 In Tull, as discussed previously, the Court found that
there was a jury trial right for the statutory cause of action by emphasizing
the importance of the remedy sought over the historical analogue for the
cause of action. 150 But the decision did involve a curtailment of the jury function with respect to the remedy phase of the trial. The Court held that the
judge rather than the jury should determine the amount of civil penalties,
stating that "[t]he Seventh Amendment is silent on the question whether a
jury must determine the remedy in a trial in which it must determine liability."' 151 The Court reasoned, therefore, that whether the remedy must go to
the jury depended "on whether the jury must shoulder this responsibility as
necessary to preserve the 'substance of the common-law right of trial by
jury.'"152 Although the Court used language that indicated it was applying
the principles of the second strand of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence,
there was a major difference. Typically, when the Court has made changes in
jury practices or procedures, it has nonetheless noted that any changes are
limited by the necessity of preserving the substance of the jury trial right,
which it has repeatedly defined as the jury's fact-finding role. In Tull, the
Court spoke of the "'substance of the common-law right,"153 but it never
defined what that substance was. Although it cited Professor Scott's classic
article, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, for the proposition
that ""[o]nly those incidents which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent
in and of the essence of the system of trial by jury, are placed beyond the
reach of the legislature,"' 1154 the Court never specified what those fundamental incidents were. Professor Scott did define in his article what he believed to be the essential elements of the jury trial right: (1) having a jury
composed of twelve persons, (2) having a unanimous verdict, (3) having a
jury that is impartial and competent, and (4) having the jury determine questions of fact.155 By the time of Tull, of course, the Court had already approved of juries composed of fewer than twelve persons, but the other
elements of the jury trial right appeared to remain intact. The Court in Tull,
however, without considering these elements, simply concluded that Congress's ability to set penalties has not been questioned, that British practice
148 Id. at 486. This language concerning the importance of the jury has been cited in a
number of other Supreme Court cases, see, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391
v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990); ParklaneHosiery, 439 U.S. at 346; Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S.
149, 187-88 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501
(1959), as well as in dozens of lower court decisions.

149 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
150 See id.'at421.
151 Id. at 425-26.
152
153
154
155

Id. at 426 (quoting Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 157).
Id. (quoting Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 157).
Id. (quoting Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 156 n.11 (quoting Scott, supra note 24, at 671)).
See Scott, supra note 24, at 675-78.
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was similar, and that therefore "[t]he assessment of a civil penalty is not one
of the 'most fundamental elements." 156 What the Court disregarded is that
determining monetary remedies has long been considered a question of fact
for the jury. 157 In Dimick v. Schiedt, the Court stated that the parties are
entitled "to have a jury properly determine the question of liability and the
extent of the injury by an assessment of damages. Both are questions of
fact."158
The Court's decision in Tull to allocate the determination of the amount
of civil penalties to the judge was distinguished in a recent case, Feltner v.
Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. In Feltne, discussed below in greater detail, the Court held that the amount of statutory damages in a copyright case
must be decided by a jury, despite Congress's allocation of this task to the
courts. 159 The Court noted that "there is overwhelming evidence that the
consistent practice at common law was for juries to award damages."'160 The
Court gave two bases for distinguishing Tull. First, it stated that in Tull, the
Court had not been presented with any evidence that juries had historically
determined the amount of civil penalties which must be paid to the government. 161 Second, the Court explained that determining civil penalties could
be viewed as analogous to sentencing in a criminal proceeding. 62 Because
no similar analogy could be made in Feltner, and because there was "clear
and direct historical evidence that juries, both as a general matter and in
to a successful plaintiff,"
copyright cases, set the amount of damages awarded
63
the Court in Feltner found Tull to be inapposite.
Further, the Court appeared to indicate some dissatisfaction with the
decision in Tull to take the remedy issue away from the jury:
It should be noted that Tull is at least in tension with Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley's Lessee, in which the Court held in light of the Seventh Amendment that a jury must determine the amount of
compensation for improvements to real estate, and with Dimick v.
Schiedt, in which the Court held that the Seventh Amendment bars
the use of additur. 64
The Court also observed that denying the jury the right to determine civil
penalties in Tull was "arguably dicta." 165 Thus, although Tull was consistent
with the first strand of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence in its use of the
historical test to determine whether there is a civil jury trial right, it formed a
156 Tull, 481 U.S. at 426 (quoting Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943)).
157 See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 353 (1998) ("It has long

been recognized that 'by the law the jury are judges of the damages."' (citations omitted)); Bank
of Hamilton v. Dudley's Lessee, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 492, 525 (1829).

158 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
159 See Feltner, 523 U.S. at 354-55; infra Part V.B.
160 Feltner,523 U.S. at 353.
161 See id. at 355.
162 See id.
163 Id.

164 Id. at 355 n.9 (citations omitted).
165 Id. at 354 n.8.
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narrow exception to the second strand with respect to the jury's role in determining the amount of civil penalties.
As described above, as long as the jury's fact-finding role is preserved,
the Supreme Court has been willing to approve many kinds of changes to
jury trial procedures and practices. 166 While they may directly protect the
jury's fact-finding function, the changed procedures may indirectly reduce
the role of juries. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in ParklaneHosiery Co. v.
Shore, raised this warning:
To say that the Seventh Amendment does not tie federal courts to
the exact procedure of the common law in 1791 does not imply,
however, that any nominally "procedural" change can be implemented, regardless of its impact on the functions of the jury....
[N]o amount of argument that the device provides for more efficiency or more accuracy or is fairer will save it if the degree of invasion of the jury's province is greater than allowed in 1791. To rule
otherwise would effectively permit judicial repeal of the Seventh
Amendment because nearly any change in the province of the jury,
no matter how drastic the diminution of its functions, can always be
denominated "procedural reform."' 67
Justice Rehnquist observed that whatever procedural changes are made,
they cannot be allowed to invade the "jury's province," presumably its factfinding function. 168 Yet, the jury has unquestionably lost much of its factfinding power indirectly through various "procedural" devices. The courts
have, of course, always had a gatekeeping function with respect to evidence
admitted at trial. The judge is able to keep matters from the jury without
offending the Seventh Amendment when the evidence is cumulative, irrelevant, or prejudicial, or when there are no genuine disputed issues of fact. 169
To the extent, however, that the gate becomes narrower with respect to
ordinary factual issues, the jury's role is reduced and the Seventh Amendment guarantee is weakened. The easing of the requirements for motions for
summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law have resulted in fewer
cases ever getting to the jury.170 Because the question of the sufficiency of
166 See supra Part II.B.
dissenting).
167 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 345-46 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
168 See id. at 346 (Rehnquist, J.,
169 Conversely, the judge can also send to the jury, based on rules of evidence, matters
which may not have been sent to the jury in 1791. In Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372
(1943), the Court noted that
[t]he rules governing the admissibility of evidence, for example, have a real impact
on the jury's function as a trier of facts and the judge's power to impinge on that
function. Yet it would hardly be maintained that the broader rules of admissibility
now prevalent offend the Seventh Amendment because at the time of its adoption
evidence now admitted would have been excluded.
Id.at 391 n.22.
170 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (finding that like directed
verdicts, summary judgment decisions are meant to screen out cases due to insufficient evidence
as a matter of law, thus eliminating the need for a jury trial); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986) (same). In 1991, Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
changed so that judgment notwithstanding the verdict and directed verdict were both replaced
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the evidence in both instances is viewed as a matter of law, the jury's role as
171
finder of fact has shrunk as the role of the court has expanded.
In some respects, the jury would be much less effective today if its practices and procedures had been frozen in 1791. As Justice Ginsburg noted in
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities,172 "[i]f the meaning of the Seventh
Amendment were fixed in 1791, our civil juries would remain, as they unquestionably were at common law, 'twelve good men and true."173 Today, of
course, the composition of juries is quite different from the typical white
male jury of 1791. In Colgrove v. Battin, the Court permitted six person juries,' 7 4 and in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 75 the Court held that litigants are
entitled to "an impartial jury drawn from a cross section of the
1 76

community."

with a single term: judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a), (b). The basic
practice has not changed under the new name, however. See id. In Galloway, Justice Black in
dissent decried the directed verdict as "a long step toward the determination of fact by judges
instead of by juries." Galloway, 319 U.S. at 401 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black noted that
in the nineteenth century, a case had to go to the jury unless there was "no evidence whatever"
to support a party's contentions. Id. at 402 (Black, J., dissenting). By the early twentieth century, the judge had the obligation to weigh the evidence, and if it was overwhelming for either
party, he could direct a verdict. See id. at 404-05 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 94 (1930)). The current standard is simply if "there is no legally sufficient
evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue," the court can grant
judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Crv. P. 50(a)(1).
171 See Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654,659 (1935) ("Whether the
evidence [supporting motions to dismiss and for a directed verdict] was sufficient or otherwise
was a question of law to be resolved by the court."). Professor Dooley has noted that by characterizing the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law, the judge can second-guess the jury
without appearing to "re-examine" decided facts or usurp jury power. "By enlarging the domain
of 'legal questions,' by recognizing devices that facilitate second-guessing of jury decisions, and
by redefining the circumstances under which that interference may occur, the legal system has
quietly but unquestionably eroded the power of the jury." Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries,
Our Selves: The Power, Perception,and Politicsof the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 325, 33335 (1995) (citations omitted).
172 518 U.S. 415 (1995).
173 Id. at 436 n.20 (quoting 3 WILLi ,

BLAcKSrOME, CommENTARiEs *349) (citing Capital

Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899)). Gasperini held that "New York's law controlling
compensation awards for excessiveness or inadequacy can be given effect, without detriment to
the Seventh Amendment, if the review standard set out [in the New York law] is applied by the
federal trial court judge, with appellate control of the trial court's ruling limited to review for
'abuse of discretion."' Id.at 419.
174 See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 159-60 (1973).
175 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
176 Id. at 220; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1994) (requiring "grand and petit juries [to be]
selected at random from a fair cross section of the community"). Professor Laura Dooley argues
that growth of restraints on jury power, as well as disdain for jury "irrationality" have paralleled
and possibly been prompted by the increasing inclusion of women and minorities on the jury.
The story of the civil jury in America is a tale that mixes progress in access for all
citizens to this treasured civic duty with progressive decline in the influence associated with that duty....
... [A] correlation may be drawn between the decline of jury influence and the
inevitable post-Civil War change in jury personnel: as the jury became an object of
demographic diversification, restraints on its power also were tightening. The very
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In sum, the Court has approved numerous changes in judicial procedures
that affect whether cases go to a jury, as well as changes in the composition of
juries themselves. Until Markman, however, with the lone exception of the
determination of the amount of civil penalties in Tull, the Court had repeatedly held that the substance of the jury trial right-the jury's fact-finding
role-mus't be preserved.
C. Merger of Law and Equity
While the sphere of the jury's power has clearly been reduced as a result
of the strengthening of devices such as summary judgment and judgment as a
matter of law, the Court preserved and even expanded the jury's fact-finding
function as a result of the merger of legal and equitable causes of action in
federal lawsuits in 1938.177 This third strand of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence concerns what must be "preserved" of the jury trial right when
legal and equitable issues are joined in the same action.
In cases where issues of law and equity were mixed, the Court essentially
rejected the application of traditional rules in favor of a practical, yet principled interpretation of the Seventh Amendment guarantee. The result was
that more issues in mixed law and equity cases could be tried by juries. In
Beacon Theatres;Inc. v. Westover,178 Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,179 and Ross

v. Bernhard,180 the Court determined that procedural changes resulting from
the merger of law and equity reduced the need for issues to be tried'in equity,
because adequate remedies were available in one lawsuit before a court that
could hear both legal and equitable issues.
In Beacon Theatres, Beacon notified Fox West Coast Theaters ("Fox")
that it considered Fox's contracts with movie distributors, which gave Fox the
exclusive right to show first-run movies in the San Bernardino area, to be in
violation of the antitrust laws.' 81 Rather than waiting to be sued, however,
Fox struck first by seeking a declaration that its contracts did not violate the
antitrust laws, and seeking an injunction to prevent Beacon from bringing the
antitrust action against Fox.182 Beacon answered, and, by counterclaim, asserted its antitrust claim against Fox.183 Fox's complaint was equitable in nature, but Beacon's counterclaim was legal.184
The lower courts followed the then-prevailing method of trial order
when the plaintiff sought equitable relief and the defendant sought legal relief. That method was to first try the plaintiff's equitable claims to the court
institution that was touted by constitutional framers as the bulwark of liberty had
become a dangerous vehicle for upsetting the status quo.
Dooley, supra note 171, at 349, 354.
177 When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938, they provided for
"only one action-a 'civil action'-in which all claims may be joined and all remedies are available." Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539 (1970); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 1, 2, 18.
178 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959).
179 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962).
180 Ross, 396 U.S. at 540.
181 See Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 502.
182 See iU at 502-03.
183

184

See id at 503.
See id.
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before a jury could hear the defendant's legal counterclaim. 185 Because of
the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the judge's findings on the issues of fact
common to both the equitable and legal claims would bind the jury in the
legal action, thus denying a fact-finding role for the jury on those issues.
The Supreme Court, disagreeing with the lower courts, held that where
legal and equitable claims are brought in one action, and where there are
factual issues common to both the legal and equitable causes of action, a
court cannot, absent exceptional circumstances, deprive a litigant of his right
to a jury trial by trying the equitable claim first.186 Because of the Seventh
Amendment guarantee, the trial court's discretion as to the order of trying
issues is quite limited: "Since the right to jury trial is a constitutional
one .... while no similar requirement protects trials by the court, that discretion is very narrowly limited and must, wherever possible, be exercised to
preserve jury trial."'187
Prior to the merger of law and equity, courts of equity sometimes enjoined legal claims to protect fully the rights of the plaintiff in equity. A
plaintiff who requested an injunction might suffer irreparable harm if the injunction could not be considered until after legal claims were first resolved.
Thus, equitable claims were frequently heard before legal claims. 188 The
Court made clear, however, that the merger of legal and equitable causes of
action in the same lawsuit ended the need to resolve all equitable issues
before proceeding to legal ones: "Inadequacy of remedy and irreparable
harm are practical terms .... As such their existence today must be determined, not by precedents decided under discarded procedures, but in the
light of the remedies now made available by the Declaratory Judgment Act
and the Federal Rules."'1 89 Rather than mandating the determination of equitable causes of action first at the expense of the jury trial right, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure now permit legal and equitable causes of action to
be tried together, so equitable issues needing immediate relief can be dealt
with on a temporary basis pending a jury trial on the legal issues. 19° Collateral estoppel would now work in the other direction-the jury's findings on
the issues of fact common to both the equitable and legal claims would bind
the judge in the equitable action.
Trying Fox's equitable claims first would mean that Beacon would not
have been entitled to a jury trial on its antitrust claim with respect to the
185 See id.; John C. McCoid, II, ProceduralReform and the Right to a Jury Trial: A Study of

Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1, 5 (1967) (discussing "equity's traditional power to enjoin, pending adjudication in equity, proceedings at law instituted by plaintiff's
adversary" (citing 3 JosN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1360-1361, 1363 (San

Francisco, A.L. Bancroft & Co. 1883))).
186 See Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 510-11.
187 Id. at 510 (footnote omitted).

188 See McCoid, supra note 185, at 5-6, 15-17; see also Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 507
("[C]ourts of equity ... were, in some cases, allowed to enjoin subsequent legal actions between
the same parties involving the same controversy . . . because the subsequent legal ac-

tion... might not protect the right of the equity plaintiff to a fair and orderly adjudication of the
controversy." (citations omitted)).
189 Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 507 (citations omitted).
190 See id. at 508.
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issues of fact common to both claims. Thus, part of the antitrust claim would
be tried to the judge and part to the jury. The Court found such a result
impermissible: "Since the issue of violation of the antitrust laws often turns
on the reasonableness of a restraint on trade in the light of all the facts, it is
particularly undesirable to have some of the relevant considerations tried by
one fact finder and some by another."' 191 Trying all the issues to a jury in the
first instance would better serve the purpose of producing a coherent determination based on all underlying factual issues.
Beacon Theatres marked a kind of watershed in the development of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. The dissenters-Justices Stewart, Harlan,
and Whittaker-maintained that the Court was improperly using the Federal
Rules to expand the jury trial right beyond its historical scope of application. 192 These Justices viewed the decision as violating the express prohibition of any such expansion contained in the congressional authorization of
the Federal Rules. 193 The majority, however, thought that the procedural obstacles to a jury trial of common issues in actions with both legal and equitable claims had been removed by the merger of the claims in a single action:
"Since in the federal courts equity has always acted only when legal remedies
were inadequate, the expansion of adequate legal remedies provided by the
Declaratory Judgment Act and the Federal Rules necessarily ,affects the
scope of equity."'1 94 According to the Court, the inadequacy of a legal rem-

edy that had formerly justified deciding equity issues prior to legal issues had
now been cured by new procedures. 95
The Court reaffirmed its Beacon Theatres holding three years later in
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood.196 The case involved the breach of a franchise
contract and trademark infringement. Dairy Queen's complaint sought injunctions against the future use of their trademark and franchise by Wood, an
191 Id. at 508 n.10 (citations omitted).
192 See id. at 518-19 (Harlan, Whittaker, and Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
193 See id. (Harlan, Whittaker, and Stewart, JJ., dissenting). Both the Federal Rules and
the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1994), in their view, merely preserve,

but do not expand, the right to jury trial "historically cognizable at common law." See Beacon
Theatres, 359 U.S. at 518-19 (Harlan, Whittaker, and Stewart, JJ., dissenting); see also 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2201, 2202.
194 Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 509 (citations omitted). The Court noted that, in delegating to the Supreme Court the responsibility for drawing up the Federal Rules, Congress declared: "Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall preserve
the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the
Constitution." Id. at 510 n.16 (quoting Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2072, 62 Stat. 869, 961
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072)). Section 2072 no longer references the common law
or Seventh Amendment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
195 See Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 509; see also McCoid, supra note 185, at 6. Professor
McCoid stated that Beacon Theatres is consistent with the view that the scope of Seventh
Amendment protection has always been one of "jurisdictional lines between law on the one
hand, and equity and admiralty on the other." McCoid, supra note 185, at 23. Because Seventh
Amendment protection is based on a jurisdictional principle, the jurisdiction should be determined by present, not past procedure. See id. at 23-24. Professor McCoid concluded that "[t]he
Beacon decision.., clearly enlarges enjoyment of jury trial as of right and reflects a basic pro-

jury bias. That it should do so is quite clear, in view of the pro-jury bias of the Constitution." Id.
at 24.

196 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
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accounting, and an injunction preventing Wood from collecting money from
Dairy Queen stores in the territory.197 Reversing both the trial and appellate
courts on the question of the right to a jury trial, the Supreme Court rejected
the district court's view that the issues raised were either "'purely equitable"'
or that the legal issues were "'incidental' to equitable issues." 198 The Court
quickly noted that the district court's characterization of legal issues as "incidental" does not in any way affect the right to a jury trial on legal issues: "'It
would make no difference if the equitable cause clearly outweighed the legal
cause so that the basic issue of the case taken as a whole is equitable. As
long as any legal cause is involved the jury rights it creates control.' "199
The respondents had contended that their claim was entirely equitable,
based on the fact that the complaint sought an "accounting. '200 The Court,
however, held that simply casting the complaint in terms of an "accounting,"
rather than as an action for debt or damages, could not obscure the fact that
there was an adequate remedy at law.20' According to the Court,
the constitutional right to trial by jury cannot be made to depend
upon the choice of words used in the pleadings. The necessary prerequisite to the right to maintain a suit for an equitable accounting,
like all other equitable remedies, is, as we pointed out in Beacon
Theatres, the absence of an adequate remedy at law.202
The Court maintained that for an accounting to be an equitable matter,
the plaintiff had to demonstrate "that the 'accounts between the parties'
[were] of such a 'complicated nature' that only a court of equity [could] satisfactorily unravel them. '20 3 The Court noted, however, that Dairy Queen was
not such a case. 20 4 The Court observed that it was unlikely that an accounting would be considered equitable in view of the power given the district
courts under Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to appoint masters.20 5 Because the masters would "assist the jury in those exceptional cases
where the legal issues are too complicated for the jury adequately to handle
alone, the burden of such a showing is considerably increased and it will indeed be a rare case in which it can be met. '20 6 As in Beacon Theatres, the
Court found that a change in procedural rules eliminated the need for an
equitable proceeding, because there was no need for the accounting to be
characterized as equitable.20 7 The principle derived from both Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen appears to be that where the remedy at law is adequate
197 See id. at 475.
198 Id. at 470 (quoting McCullough v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 686, 687 (E.D. Pa.

1961), rev'd sub nom. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962)). The Third Circuit had
denied mandamus without opinion. See id.
199 Id. at 473 n.8 (quoting Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d

486, 491 (5th Cir. 1961)).
200 See id.at 477.

201 See id. at 477-78.
202 Id. (citing Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-10 (1959)).
203 Id. at 478 (quoting Kirby v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. R.R. Co., 120 U.S. 130, 134 (1887)).

204 See id. at 478-79.
205 See id. at 478; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
206 Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 478 (footnote omitted).
207 Although similar procedures antedate the federal rules, appointing masters is a proce-
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as a result of modified procedures, equity no longer has jurisdiction, even
though such jurisdiction may well have existed under earlier forms of
procedure. 208
The Court found that changed procedures also supported a jury trial
right in a shareholder's derivative action, which, pre-merger, had sounded in
equity. In Ross v. Bernhard,20 9 shareholders of the Lehman Corporation
brought an action derivatively against the directors of the corporation and
the corporation's brokers, Lehman Brothers, contending that Lehman Brothers illegally controlled the corporation, and used this control to exact excesappeals had ruled that a derivative
sive brokerage fees.2 1 0 The court of 21
action was entirely equitable in nature. '
Referring to Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen, the Supreme Court held
that:
[t]he heart of the action is the corporate claim. If it presents a legal
issue, one entitling the corporation to a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment, the right to a jury is not forfeited merely because the
first be adjudicated as an equitable
stockholder's right to sue21must
2
issue triable to the court.
Here again the merger of legal and equitable claims in one lawsuit had removed procedural impediments to trial by jury. The shareholders' claims
were essentially claims at law, although brought in an equitable action:
The historical rule preventing a court of law from entertaining a
shareholder's suit on behalf of the corporation is obsolete; it is no
longer tenable for a district court, administering both law and equity
in the same action, to deny legal remedies to a corporation, merely
because the corporation's spokesmen are its shareholders rather
than its directors. Under the rules, law and equity are procedurally
combined; nothing turns now upon the form of the action or the
procedural devices by which the parties happen to come before the
court. The "expansion of adequate legal remedies provided
2 13
by... the Federal Rules necessarily affects the scope of equity.
Although the dissenters in Ross objected strongly to what they considered to be the majority's rejection of "history, logic, and over 100 years of
firm precedent, '214 the majority's decision appears to be quite consistent with
dural innovation when compared with rules of 1791. See Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 307-09

(1920); see also McCoid, supra note 185, at 8.
208 See McCoid, supra note 185, at 12-13.
209 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
210 See id. at 531.
211 See Ross v. Bernhard, 403 F.2d 909, 912 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd, 396 U.S. at 543. The
district court had held that the shareholders had a jury trial right, because the cause of action
they were asserting on behalf of the corporation was legal in nature. See Ross v. Bernhard, 275
F. Supp. 569, 570-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd, 403 F.2d at 910, rev'd, 396 U.S. at 543.
212 Ross, 396 U.S. at 539.
213 Id. at 540 (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959)).
214 Id. at 544 (Burger, C.J., Harlan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting). Two of the three dissenters,
Justices Harlan and Stewart, had also dissented in Beacon Theatres. See Beacon Theatres, 359
U.S. at 511 (Stewart, Harlan, and Whittaker, JJ., dissenting).
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the Seventh Amendment. Just as it did in Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen,
the Court in Ross followed the rule that equity is only available when irreparable harm is threatened and there is no adequate remedy at law.2 15 Before
law and equity courts had merged, the need for quick action sometimes justified equity claims being heard first at the cost of the jury trial right on the
legal claims. After the merger of the law and equity courts, however, a court
could act quickly to provide temporary equitable relief, while fully protecting
the jury trial right for the claims at law. The Court's approach in this area is
consistent with modem constitutional interpretation, which views the Constitution "as a living, growing entity," and "'as a durable document providing
216
continuingly useful standards for an evolving society."
In sum, this third strand of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence demonstrates that when the merger of law and equity courts removed the practical
impediment to trying legal issues prior to determining issues in equity, the
Court expanded the application of the jury trial right, but preserved the principle that equity will not decide issues which have an adequate remedy at
law.
D. Deference to CongressionalStatutory Scheme
While the Court preserved and even expanded the jury trial right in
cases involving both legal and equitable issues, it also delineated an entire
area which it found to be outside the Seventh Amendment guarantee. In a
series of decisions, the Court determined that the Seventh Amendment did
not apply to new statutory areas involving "public rights," where Congress
had established administrative bodies and non-Article III courts as fact
217
finders.
The development of this doctrine is illustrated by Katchen v. Landry,218 a
bankruptcy case in which the trustee sought return of a preference. 2 19
215 See Ross, 369 U.S. at 539-40. From 1789 until 1938, the judicial code forbade courts of

equity from accepting jurisdiction of any suit for which there was an adequate remedy at law.
See id. at 539. The Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 267, 36 Stat. 1087, 1163, re-enacting the Act
of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82, provided: "Suits in equity shall not be sustained in
any court of the United States in any case where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be

had at law." Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 267, quoted in Ross, 396 U.S. at 539 n.12.
216 Martin H. Redish & Daniel J. La Fave, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial in NonArticle III Proceedings: A Study in Dysfunctional ConstitutionalTheory, 4 WM. & MARY BILL

OF Rrs. J. 407, 415 & n.36 (1995) (quoting McCoid, supra note 185, at 11).
217 Some early cases stating that Congress could provide for determinations involving public rights outside the judicial sphere include Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement

Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 280-81 (1855) (asserting that Congress is not required to bring certain matters, involving public rights, which may be susceptible to judicial determination, within
the cognizance of the courts), and Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932) (distinguishing

between private rights and rights involving government's authority to perform constitutional
functions of the executive or legislative departments).
218 382 U.S. 323 (1966).

219 See id. at 325. A "preference" occurs when an insolvent debtor distributes or pays to
one or more of its creditors a larger amount than they would have been entitled to receive on a
pro rata distribution among creditors. See MICHAEL J.HERBERT, UNDERSTANDING
RuTrcY 247, 250 (1995).

BANK-

Bankruptcy courts are sometimes referred to as non-Article III courts, because they are not
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Although some courts have viewed bankruptcy proceedings as inherently equitable, some actions brought by trustees in bankruptcy in federal court have

traditionally had a jury trial right.220 In Katchen, a creditor had filed a claim

in a bankruptcy proceeding, and the trustee in turn sought the return of a

preference from the creditor. 221 Although seeking a return of the preference
would normally require a plenary action in the federal courts where the cred-

itor would have a jury trial right, the Court in Katchen upheld the summary
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to decide all issues.222 The Court distinguished this case from Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen on the ground that
this case "involved a specific statutory scheme contemplating the prompt trial
223
of a disputed claim without the intervention of a jury."
Deference to a congressional statutory scheme also undergirded the
Court's decision in Atlas Roofing Co. v. OccupationalSafety & Health Review
Commission,2 4 which affirmed findings that two employers had violated
safety standards promulgated under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 ("OSHA").22 5 The employers challenged the administrative procedures under OSHA as contravening the Seventh Amendment by denying
them a right to a jury trial.226 The Court held that the Seventh Amendment
"does not prohibit Congress from assigning the factfinding function and initial adjudication to an administrative forum with which the jury would be
incompatible."'227 A further limitation set forth by the Court, however, was
explicitly authorized by Article III of the U.S. Constitution. In this sense, they resemble the
non-Article III fora created by Congress to resolve issues administratively.
220 Compare Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939) (stating that "for many purposes
'courts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity"' (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292
U.S. 234, 240 (1934))), and Nordberg v. Granfinanciera, S.A., 835 F.2d 1341, 1349 (11th Cir.
1988), rev'd, 492 U.S. 33 (1989) (holding that "bankruptcy ... is equitable in nature and thus
bankruptcy proceedings are inherently equitable"), with Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S.
92, 95 (1932) (finding that after an equitable suit seeking a preference had been filed against
them, defendants were entitled to a transfer to a court of law because plaintiff "'had a plain,
adequate, and complete remedy at law"' (citations omitted)).
221 See Katchen, 382 U.S. at 325.
222 See id. at 340. A "plenary action" is a complete and formal hearing or trial on the
merits, as opposed to a summary hearing which is generally more informal. See May v. Henderson, 268 U.S. 111, 115 (1925). Some preferences may be recovered only by a plenary action in
federal court, and in such an action, the creditor could demand a jury trial. See Schoenthal, 287
U.S. at 95-96.
Eleven years after Katchen, in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Commission, 430 U.S. 442 (1977), the Court explained its decision in Katchen as being based
upon the bankruptcy court's status as a "specialized court of equity" which "constituted a forum
before which a jury would be out of place and would go far to dismantle the statutory scheme."
Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 454 n.11.
223 Katchen, 382 U.S. at 339.
224 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
225 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994 & Supp. III 1998); see Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 461.
226 See Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 448-49.
227 Id. at 450. The Court's deference to Congress in Atlas Roofing was severely criticized
by Martin Redish and Daniel La Fave:
[T]he fact that enforcement of a constitutional right would severely disrupt a congressional scheme must be deemed irrelevant, lest our essential constitutional
structure be turned on its head. By way of contrast, few constitutional theorists
today would suggest that the First Amendment right of free expression must give
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that Congress could reserve fact-finding functions in administrative agencies
only in cases in which "public rights" were being litigated, "cases in which the
Government sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce public rights created by
statutes within the power of Congress to enact. 2 28 The Court's justification
for this deference to Congress was that juries have not been the exclusive fact
finders in all cases, because admiralty and equity actions were always decided
without a jury.229 The Court determined that "there is little or no basis for

concluding that the Amendment should now be interpreted to provide an
impenetrable barrier to administrative factfinding under otherwise valid federal regulatory statutes." 230 The Court then announced an additional prong
for its test of Seventh Amendment applicability: "Thus, history and our cases
support the proposition that the right to a jury trial turns not solely on the
nature of the issue to be resolved but also on the forum in which it is to be
resolved." 23 1
In its decision in Atlas Roofing, the Court proclaimed that an entire area
of law was beyond the scope of the Seventh Amendment: new statutory actions created by Congress and assigned for adjudication to an administrative
agency, as long as the actions involved public rights.23 2 A little over a decade
later, in 1989, the Court in Granfinanciera,S.A. v. Nordberge3 3 enlarged the
definition of public rights by no longer requiring that the government be one
of the parties involved. 23 4 At the same time, the Court refined its view of the
command of the Seventh Amendment, acknowledging limitations on the
235
scope of Congress's ability to withdraw a matter completely from the jury.
The Court returned to the bankruptcy arena in Granfinanciera. In the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,236 Congress
designated fraudulent conveyance actions as "core proceedings" which could
be adjudicated by non-Article III bankruptcy judges. 23 7 The trustee in
way merely because its enforcement would be "incompatible" with a congressional
scheme. Certainly, such an approach would be inconsistent with current free
speech doctrine. Congress could not, for example, constitutionally prohibit criticism of one of its legislative programs because such criticism could have the effect
of undermining achievement of the program's social goals. A greater departure
from our constitutional scheme would result from total judicial deference to a congressional determination concerning that incompatibility. The Court has provided
absolutely no principled basis on which to distinguish, for these purposes, the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial from the First Amendment right of free
expression.
Redish & La Fave, supra note 216, at 450 (footnotes omitted).
228 Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 450. The Court also noted that "[w]holly private tort, contract, and property cases, as well as a vast range of other cases, are not at all implicated." Id. at
458.
229 See id at 450 & n.7.
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237

Id. at 460.
Id. at 460-61.
See id. at 455.
492 U.S. 33 (1989).

See id. at 54.
See id. at 51-52.
Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 104(a), 98 Stat. 333, 340 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1994)).
See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H). Section 157(b)(1) provides:
Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all core
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Granfinancierasued two foreign corporations in federal court to recover allegedly fraudulent transfers. 23 8 The corporations, which had not filed claims
as creditors in the bankruptcy case, sought but were denied a jury trial.239
Despite the congressional determination that fraudulent conveyances were
core proceedings adjudicable by bankruptcy judges, the Court determined
that fraudulent conveyance actions, which "'constitute no part of the proceedings in bankruptcy but concern controversies arising out of it'-are
quintessentially suits at common law .... They therefore appear matters of
private rather than public right. ' 240 In such a case, the Court held, the Sev-

enth Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial: "Congress cannot eliminate a party's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial merely by relabeling
the cause of action to which it attaches and placing exclusive jurisdiction in
41
'2
an administrative agency or a specialized court of equity.
In Granfinanciera,the Court no longer defined "public right" to include
matters arising only between the government and others. Reiterating a definition it first proposed four years earlier in Thomas v. Union Carbide AgriculturalProducts Co. ,242 the Court stated that a public right is one "involving
statutory rights that are integral parts of a public regulatory scheme and
whose adjudication Congress has assigned to an administrative agency or specialized court of equity." 243 The Court did not go so far as to hold that "the
restructuring of the debtor-creditor relations is in fact a public right,"
although it noted that the plurality in an earlier case had suggested that it
proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11, referred under
subsection (a) of this section, and may enter appropriate orders and judgments,

subject to review under section 158 of this title.
Id. § 157(b)(1). Section 157(b)(2) then provides a non-exclusive list of core proceedings.

238 See Granfinanciera,492 U.S. at 36.
239 See id. at 37.
240 Id. at 56 (quoting Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92, 94-95 (1932)). The Court

noted that the plurality decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co. stated that the debtor creditor relations in bankruptcy "may well be a 'public right,"' but

"that state-law causes of action for breach of contract or warranty are paradigmatic private
rights, even when asserted by an insolvent corporation in the midst of Chapter 11 reorganization
proceedings." Id. (quoting Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50, 71 (1982)).
241 Id. at 61. The Court distinguished Katchen by noting that the creditor in that case had
filed a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding, unlike the creditors in Granfinanciera. See id. at 57.
The Court asserted that its decision in Katchen turned on "the bankruptcy court's having 'actual
or constructive possession' of the bankruptcy estate." Id (quoting Katchen v. Landry, 382 U.S.
323, 327 (1966)). The Court noted further: "[B]y submitting a claim against the bankruptcy
estate, creditors subject themselves to the court's equitable power to disallow those claims, even
though the debtor's opposing counterclaims are legal in nature and the Seventh Amendment
would have entitled creditors to a jury trial had they not tendered claims against the estate." Id.
at 59 n.13.

242 473 U.S. 568 (1985). In rejecting a challenge to an Environmental Protection Agency
proceeding, the Thomas Court found the proceeding involved a public right: "Congress, acting

for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under Article I, may create a
seemingly 'private' right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a

matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary."
Id. at 593-94.
243 Granfinanciera,492 U.S. at 55 n.10.
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might well be.24 The point the Court made was that even if the restructuring
process did involve a public right, the defendants in this case were involved in
a controversy involving private rights and therefore were entitled to a jury
trial.
The Court acknowledged that requiring a jury trial could "impede iwift
resolution of bankruptcy proceedings and increase the expense of Chapter 11
reorganizations." 245 Although it had used an "efficiency" argument in Atlas
Roofing as part of its justification for administrative fact-finding in the context of OSHA, the Court in Granfinancieramade clear that considerations of
efficiency did not overcome the Seventh Amendment's clear command:
""'[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful
in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is
'246
contrary to the Constitution."'
In sum, the Supreme Court, while deferring to the power of Congress to
create administrative adjudication systems and non-Article III courts in specialized areas, has placed limits on the scope of these tribunals. Parties to
traditional common law actions, not clearly within the scope of authority of
such "legislative courts," still have jury trial rights. Moreover, the Court continues to acknowledge that arguments of efficiency and convenience do not
support derogation of the guarantee of a jury trial.
Thus, by the last decade of the twentieth century, there were four parallel strands in the Court's Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. The existence
of the right to a jury trial is determined by a historical test of whether the
action was more likely to have been tried in the courts of law or equity in
1791. The Court uses a two-pronged approach to make this determination,
examining the nature of the action and the remedy sought. 24 7 The scope of
the jury trial right appears to be flexible, not limited to the same procedures
and practices found in 1791, as long as the heart of the guarantee-the jury's
fact-finding role-is preserved. 248 Although reduced in scope by certain proId. at 56 n.11 (citing Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 71).
Id. at 63.
246 Id. (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 944 (1983))); see also Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 384 (1974) (discounting
arguments that jury trials would be unduly burdensome and rejecting "the notion that there is
some necessary inconsistency between the desire for speedy justice and the right to jury trial").
The Court's Atlas Roofing argument stated: "Congress is not required by the Seventh
Amendment to choke the already crowded federal courts with new types of litigation or prevented from committing some new types of litigation to administrative agencies with special
244
245

competence in the relevant field." Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review

Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977).
247 See Wooddell v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93, 97 (1991).
""'First, we compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, we examine the remedy sought
and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature."' The second inquiry is the more important in our analysis." Id. (quoting Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494
U.S. 558,565 (1990) (quoting TIl v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,417-18 (1987))). The "historical
test" has been severely criticized. See, e.g., Chauffeurs,494 U.S. at 574-81 (Brennan, J., concurring); Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpretthe Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil
Jury Trial, 53 Osno ST. L.J. 1005, 1006 (1992); Wolfram, supra note 12, at 731-47.
248

Vith respect to the "substance" of the Seventh Amendment-the jury's fact-finding
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cedural devices which allow fewer cases to reach the jury, the right has ex-

panded vis a vis equity's ability to restrict its application. When legal and
equitable claims are combined in one case with common factual issues, the

jury trial right cannot be denied by trying equitable issues first. The major
exception to the jury trial right-that Congress can assign resolution of a
claim to a non-Article III adjudicative body that does not use, a jury as fact
finder-appears limited to new public rights created by Congress, and does
not impact traditional private rights in areas such as contract, tort, or

property.249
III.

Markman and Its Effect on Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence

Discussion of the four strands of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence sets
the stage for consideration of the Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Markman
v. Westview Instruments. This part discusses how Markman, viewed in light of
these four strands, creates a narrow exception to the Seventh Amendment
guarantee. Markman is also examined to determine whether the decision,
which reduces the role of juries in the area of patent law, indicates that simi-

lar changes are likely when applying the Seventh Amendment right in other
contexts. This part concludes that although the reasoning in Markman may

to some extent be applied outside the patent law area, the decision does not
generally offer a basis for restricting the jury trial right in questions of fact in

other areas of the law.250
Markman was an action for patent infringement. Every patent document includes two distinct elements: (1) the specification and (2) one or
more claims.251 The specification explains how the invention works. 252 It
contains a description so detailed that a person skilled in the art could make
role-the Supreme Court has consistently defined this jury function to include determining credibility, weighing contradictory evidence, and drawing inferences from the facts. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (stating that "[c]redibility determinations, the
weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge").
In Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29 (1944), the Court said:
It is the jury, not the court, which is the fact-finding body. It weighs the contradictory evidence and inferences, judges the credibility of witnesses, receives expert
instructions, and draws the ultimate conclusion as to the facts. The very essence of
its function is to select from among conflicting inferences and conclusions that
which it considers most reasonable. That conclusion, whether it relates to negligence, causation or any other factual matter, cannot be ignored. Courts are not
free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury
could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that
other results are more reasonable.
Id. at 35 (citations omitted).
249 See Granfinanciera,492 U.S. at 51.
250 But see Harbor Software, Inc. v. Applied Sys., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),
where the district court in a copyright case determined which elements of a computer program
were protectable as a matter of law, citing Markman's holding that interpretation of patent
claims is a matter of law. See id. at 1046.
251 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996).
252

See id.
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the item described.253 A claim, on the other hand, defines the scope of the
patent, and functions to forbid both identical and similar copies of the invention.25 4 The claims define the inventor's legal rights; however, all other
materials in the patent and the prosecution are used as a context to help
25 5
interpret the meaning of the claims.
Proving patent infringement is a two-step process. First, the meaning of
the patent claims must be determined. Second, the claims must be compared
with the accused device to determine if all the elements or limitations in the
claims are found, either literally or equivalently, in the accused device. Traditionally, the first step of construing the meaning of the patent claim has been
considered a matter of law for the court. As discussed below, however, underlying disputed factual issues about the meaning of the claim have been
considered issues for the jury. 256 The second step, determining whether there
25 7
is infringement, has always been a matter of fact reserved for the jury.
Claim construction has traditionally been considered a matter of law for
the court because it involves the interpretation of written documents. -8
Since the eighteenth century, interpreting written documents has been allocated to the court largely because in the eighteenth century most jurors were
illiterate. 25 9 But patent claim construction can be a complex affair, requiring
judges, who are not necessarily familiar with the technological usages and
meanings of particular "terms of art" in a given area, to hear extrinsic evidence in order to comprehend the invention and its scope.2 60 Because the
claims are not written for the general public, but for those skilled in the particular art, expert testimony is frequently sought to explain what the claims
would mean to those skilled in the art.2 61 The disputes involving the meaning
262
of these underlying terms of art have traditionally been decided by a jury.
Frequently, the determination of the meaning of disputed terms of art within
253 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). A person "skilled in the art" is one who is skilled in the area
of science in which the invention is classified.
254 See HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., PATENT LAW & PRACTICE 11-12
(2d ed. 1995).
255 "Claim language does not exist in a vacuum; it must be understood by reference to the
documents annexed to the patent grant, including the specification, of which the claims are a
part, and any drawings." Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 990 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (Mayer, J., concurring), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
256 See infra Part III.A.
257 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 377; see also SSIH Equip. S.A. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 376 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
258 See Markman, 52 F.3d at 978.
259 See Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the
Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 43, 75-76 (1980); Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury
Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1867, 1932 (1966).
260 A "term of art" includes one or more words having a specific meaning in an industry or
field which may not be the same as the ordinary meaning of the words. See Argus Chem. Corp.
v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 759 F.2d 10, 14 n.5 (Fed Cir. 1985).
261 Markman, 52 F.3d at 991 (Mayer, J., concurring).
262 See supra text accompanying notes 256-257; see also ALBERT H. WALKER, TExTnooK
OF THE PATENT LAWS OF THE UN rD STATES OF AMERICA § 536 (4th ed. 1904) ("[W]here the
question of infringement depends upon the construction of the patent, and that construction
depends upon a doubtful question in the prior art, the ... question of infringement should also

be left for the jury to decide.").
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the patent claim will also determine whether or not infringement has
occurred.

263

In Markman, the Supreme Court decided the narrow question of
whether, in construing a patent claim as a matter of law, a court must send
the underlying disputed issues of the meaning of terms of art to the jury, or
whether these issues could or must be determined by the court. 264 The Federal Circuit, 265 in an en banc decision, had held that patent claims should be
construed solely by the judge as a matter of law.266 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "the construction of a patent, including terms of art
'267 The willwithin its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.
ingness of both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court to allow these
underlying factual issues to be decided by a judge rather than a jury seems at
odds with the core Seventh Amendment guarantee that the jury will decide
disputed facts. To understand the background and scope of this issue, a
closer look at the doctrine of construction of written documents is warranted.
A.

Construing a Written Document When Underlying Facts Are Disputed

In holding that judges should construe patent claims exclusively, including the underlying factual issues pertinent to understanding the claim and
meaning of terms of art used in the claim, the Federal Circuit relied on the
"fundamental principle of American law" that courts construe written documents. 268 The corollary to that principle, however, is that where there are
disputed underlying facts, they should be sent to the jury in a jury-tried case:
Where the controversy over the [written instrument] arises in a case
which is being tried before a jury, the decision of the question of
fact is left to the jury, with instructions from the court as to how the
document shall be construed, if the jury finds that the alleged pecu269
liar meaning or usage is established.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed this practice, both in a commercial context 270 and for cases where technical words or phrases are used.271
Patent claim construction fits well within this doctrine, because extrinsic evi263 "Deciding the meaning of the words used in the patent is often dispositive of the question of infringement." Markman, 52 F.3d at 999 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Mayer, in his

opinion concurring in the judgment, but strongly disagreeing with the reasoning of the Federal
Circuit, put it even more strongly: "[Tihis is not just about claim language, it is about ejecting
juries from infringement cases. All these pages and all these words cannot camouflage what the
court well knows: to decide what the claims mean is nearly always to decide the case." Id. at 989

(Mayer, J., concurring).
264 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
265 Congress created the Federal Circuit as, inter alia, an exclusive appellate court for patent cases. See H.R. Rap. No. 97-312, at 20-23 (1981).
266 See Markman, 52 F.3d at 977.
267 Markman, 517 U.S. at 372.
268 See Markman, 52 F.3d at 978.
269 Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291-92 (1922).
270 See Rankin v. Fidelity Ins. Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 189 U.S. 242,252-53 (1903) (holding that although "the construction of written instruments is one for the court, where the case
turns upon the proper conclusions to be drawn from a series of letters, particularly of a commercial character, taken in connection with other facts and circumstances, it is one which is properly
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dence frequently must be brought in to explain technological terms and terms
272
of art within the claim.
Sending to the jury disputed issues of fact underlying the construction of
a written document has been widely accepted in contract law. 273 To distinguish the application of this doctrine, the Federal Circuit asserted that a patent was more like a statute than a contract. 274 In drawing this distinction, the
Federal Circuit claimed that the underlying factual issues in a contract frequently concern the subjective meaning of the terms in the minds of the parties to the contract. 275 For a patent, on the other hand, the test of meaning is
an objective one of what "one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention would have understood the term to mean. ' 276 This distinction,
referred to a jury" (citing Brown v. McGran, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 479, 493 (1840))). In a decision by
Mr. Justice Story, the Court stated that
there certainly are cases, in which, from the different senses of the words used, or
their obscure and indeterminate reference to unexplained circumstances, the true
interpretation of the language may be left to the consideration of the jury for the
purpose of carrying into effect the real intention of the parties.
Brown, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 493.
271 In Great Northern Railway, the Court stated:
When the words of a written instrument are used in their ordinary meaning, their
construction presents a question solely of law. But words are used sometimes in a
peculiar meaning. Then extrinsic evidence may be necessary to determine the
meaning of words appearing in the document. This is true where technical words
or phrases not commonly understood are employed. Or extrinsic evidence may be
necessary to establish a usage of trade or locality which attaches to provisions not
expressed in the language of the instrument. Where such a situation arises, and the
peculiar meaning of words, or the existence of a usage, is proved by evidence, the
function of construction is necessarily preceded by the determination of the matter
of fact. Where the controversy over the writing arises in a case which is being tried
before a jury, the decision of the question of fact is left to the jury, with instructions
from the court as to how the document shall be construed, if the jury finds that the
alleged peculiar meaning or usage is established.
Great Northern Railway, 259 U.S. at 291-92.
272 See Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 657 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("[A]lthough claim construction is a legal question, underlying fact disputes may arise pertaining to extrinsic evidence
that might preclude summary judgment treatment of claim construction."), overruled by
Markman, 52 F.3d at 977, 979; Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (when
meaning of a claim term is disputed, "then an underlying factual question arises, and construction of the claim should be left to the trier or jury under appropriate instruction"), overruled by
Markman, 52 F.3d at 977, 979; McGill, Inc. v. John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666, 672 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(when meaning of a term in the claim is disputed, and extrinsic evidence needed to explain it,
construction of claim is left to the jury, and the jury "cannot be directed to the disputed meaning"), overruled by Markman, 52 F.3d at 976, 979. These and similar cases were disapproved by
the Federal Circuit in its holding in Markman. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 979.
273

See 3

ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS

H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 616 (3d ed. 1961); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
LISTON & WALTER

§ 554 (1960); 4 SAMUEL
CONTRACTS:

WIL.

WILLISTON ON

OF CONTRACTS

§ 212(2). "A

question of interpretation of an integrated agreement is to be determined by the trier of fact if it
depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences to
be drawn from extrinsic evidence." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 212(2).
274 See Markman, 52 F.3d at 987. This argument was never discussed in the Supreme
Court's decision. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
275 See Markman, 52 F.3d at 985.
276 Id. at 986.
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however, seems questionable. In commercial documents, meaning may well
need to be determined not just by the subjective intent of the parties, but in
accordance with an objective view of meaning as determined by usage of
trade or course of dealing.2 77 Establishing that a particular word or expression in a contract had a meaning that was the common usage in a particular
trade would not be subjective, and would appear to be very similar to the
process of determining in a patent claim construction case what a particular
term meant to one skilled in the art. In both instances, expert witnesses
would probably be utilized to explain the meaning in terms of usage in a
particular trade or industry.
Not only does there exist a similarity between patents and contracts with
respect to determining objective meaning-there also appears to be a similarity with respect to determining subjective meaning. Although the Federal
Circuit asserted in Markman that claim interpretation did not depend upon
the intent of the patentee, the court has not always taken that position. In
Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-UndMarketing Gesellschaf,278 the Federal Circuit stated that
[i]nterpretation of the claim words "provide for lateral support" required that the jury give consideration and weight to several underlying factual questions, including in this case the description of the
claimed element in the specification, the intended meaning and usage of the claim terms by the patentee, what transpired during the
prosecution of the patent application, and the technological evidence offered by the expert witnesses.279
Thus, the court's attempt to distinguish patents from contracts by contrasting
objective interpretations of meaning with subjective ones does not appear
persuasive.
In addition, the Federal Circuit has, since its creation in 1982, followed
the practice of sending underlying factual disputes on matters of claim construction to the jury. There is significant precedent to this effect, set forth
quite persuasively in the concurring opinion of Judge Mayer and the dissenting opinion of Judge Newman.2 80 The majority in Markman acknowledged
"some inconsistent statements" about whether underlying issues should go to
the jury in patent claim construction. 81 The court asserted, however, that
there were actually two lines of cases-one which recognized that disputes
over the meaning of claim language may raise factual questions for the jury,
277 Section 1-205(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that "[t]he existence and
scope of ... [trade] usage are to be proved as facts." U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1999); see also Frigali-

ment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 119 (S.D.N Y. 1960) (considering evidence of trade usage in attempt to explain meaning of contract); Hurst v. W.J. Lake &

Co., Inc. 16 P.2d 627, 629-31 (Or. 1932) (reversing trial court's grant of motion for judgment on
pleadings; holding plaintiff should have been permitted to use trade usage evidence to establish

meaning of contract).
278 945 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1991), overruled by Markman, 52 F.3d at 979.

279 Id. at 1550 (emphasis added).
280 See Markman, 52 F.3d at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring); id. at 999 (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
281 See id. at 976.
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and a second line of cases which said that "claim construction is strictly a
question of law of the court."
In fact, however, there is no second line of
cases. Of the five cases cited by the Federal Circuit for this proposition, only
one lends even minimal support.283 Thus, Judge Mayer was not exaggerating
in his concurring opinion when he stated: "Contrary to what it says today,
this court (including the judges in the majority) has always held that claim
interpretation is a matter of law depending on underlying factual inquiries." 28 In a sharply worded footnote, Judge Mayer commented:
The court pretends there is a line of contrary authority. But most of
its cases arrived at this court after bench trials-a puzzling source
for guidance on the commands of the Seventh Amendment; others
actually implicating the right to a jury trial sprang from facts simply
inadequate to support a reasonable jury verdict. Indeed, the one
case that pays lip service to this novel rule, Read Corp. v. Portec,
Inc., like this case, did not require excursion beyond the patent documents themselves. There may be a reason why the court is hellbent for its result, but it does not emanate from the cases.285
Given the doctrine requiring underlying disputed facts to go to the jury
when the court construes written documents, the strong precedent in the Federal Circuit for sending these issues to the jury in appropriate cases prior to
Markman, and the strong federal policy favoring jury trials, the Supreme
Court did not have a lot to work with that would support affirming the FedId. at 977.
See id. (citing Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 822-23 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387-88 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Unique Concepts, Inc. v.
Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1561-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allan Med. Indus., Inc.,
888 F.2d 815, 818-20 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 986
(Fed. Cir. 1988)).
284 Id. at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring). Judge Mayer cited several cases as authority for this
"proposition. See id. at 989-90 (Mayer, J., concurring) (citing Arachnid Inc. v. Medalist Mktg.
Corp., 972 F.2d 1300, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating that although claim construction is an issue of
law for the court, it "may require the factfinder to resolve certain factual issues such as what
occurred during the prosecution history"); Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1206
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (similarly noting that "underlying factual issues in dispute become the jury's
province to resolve in the course of rendering its verdict on infringement"); Johnston v. IVAC
Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1579-80 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("A disputed issue of fact may, of course, arise in
connection with interpretation of a term in a claim if there is a genuine evidentiary conflict
created by the underlying probative evidence pertinent to the claim's interpretation. However,
without such evidentiary conflict, claim interpretation may be resolved as an issue of law by the
282
283

court ....

."

(citations omitted))).

Id. at 990 n.2 (Mayer, J., concurring) (citing Portec, 970 F.2d at 822-23) (additional citations omitted). The Federal Circuit also asserted that "[tihe Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that the construction of a patent claim is a matter of law exclusively for the court." Id. at 977.
Both Judge Mayer and Judge Newman pointed out the inaccuracy of this statement. Judge
Mayer commented: "Close examination of these cases, however, reveals that, like the one
before us today, interpretation of the claims at issue before the deciding court presented no real
factual question." Id. at 993 (Mayer, J., concurring). Judge Newman observed that while the
statement is correct when referring to the court's responsibility to decide the legal effect of a
patent claim, "it is not correct with respect to findings of disputed factual issues, issues that
usually relate to the meaning and scope of the technologic terms and words of technical art that
define the invention." Id. at 1021 (Newman, J., dissenting).
285
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eral Circuit's decision in Markman.28 6 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court affirmed unanimously, removing from the jury disputed factual issues in claim
construction, and asserting that this did not offend the Seventh Amendment.287 To explain what might have motivated the Supreme Court to allow
this reduction in the role of the jury, the next part of this Article analyzes the
reasoning of the Markman decision in the context of the four strands of traditional Seventh Amendment jurisprudence.
B. Markman and the Four Strands of Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence.
Markman, the inventor of a system for monitoring and reporting upon
the status, location, and movement of clothing in a dry-cleaning business,
brought an infringement action against Westview Instruments, Inc. ("Westview").3 Westview asserted that its product did not infringe Markman's
patent because it recorded an inventory of receivables by tracking invoices
and transaction totals, but could not track articles of clothing.289 Markman
attempted to prove infringement by showing that the term "inventory" as
used in his claim could refer to cash and invoices as well as articles of clothing. 290 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania first
sent the issue of claim construction to the jury, which found in Markman's
favor on two of the claims.291 Nonetheless, the district court granted Westview judgment as a matter of law.292 Under the district court's construction
of the patent claim, Westview's system did not infringe the patent because it
could not track articles of clothing through the process and generate reports
about their status and location. 293 In essence, the district court interpreted
the meaning of "inventory" differently than the jury. In affirming the district
court's decision, the Federal Circuit held en banc that the interpretation of
the terms of a patent claim was a matter exclusively for the court, and that
294
this conclusion was consistent with the Seventh Amendment.
286

See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 351 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, stated that "use of offensive collateral estoppel in this case runs

counter to the strong federal policy favoring jury trials," and noted that the Court's decision in
Beacon Theatres "exemplifies that policy." Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist

also recalled:
"The right of jury trial in civil cases At common law is a basic and fundamental

feature of our system of federal jurisprudence which is protected by the Seventh
Amendment. A right so fundamental and sacred to the citizen, whether guaranteed by the Constitution or provided by statute, should be jealously guarded by the
courts."
Id. at 352 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Jacob v. New York, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942));

see Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537-39 (1958).
287 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996).
288 See id. at 374-75.
289 See id. at 375.
290 See id.

291 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),
aff'd, 517 U.S. at 391.
292 See id. at 971.
293 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535, 1537 (E.D. Pa. 1991),

aff'd, 52 F.3d at 989, affd, 517 U.S. at 391.
294 See Markman, 52 F.3d at 984.
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The Supreme Court, affirming the Federal Circuit's decision, discussed
both the applicability of the Seventh Amendment and the policy reasons for
allocating the determination of meaning of disputed terms of art in a patent
claim to the judge rather than to the jury. While the facts of Markman are
rather straightforward, the Supreme Court's reasoning is somewhat less so.
The following parts examine how the Supreme Court's decision in Markman
compares with each of the four strands of Seventh Amendment
jurisprudence.
1.

The Historical Test

In beginning the analysis of the Seventh Amendment's applicability to
patent claim construction, Justice Soute-t asserted that the Court was following the long established practice, dating back to the Wonson decision in 1812,
of determining the right to a jury trial in accordance with "'the right which
existed under the English common law when the Amendment was
adopted." 295 After asserting that the Court's decision was "[i]n keeping with
[its] long-standing adherence to this 'historical test,"' Justice Souter then set
forth a new and unfamiliar version of that test.296 The test had two prongs:
the first was the same as the first prong of the accepted historical test, which
looked to whether the action was tried at law in 1791.297 The second prong,
however, did not look to the remedy sought, but instead contained a concept
new to Seventh Amendment jurisprudence:
In keeping with our longstanding adherence to this "historical test,"
we ask, first, whether we are dealing with a cause of action that
either was tried at law at the time of the founding or is at least
analogous to one that was. If the action in question belongs in the
law category, we then ask whether the particular trial decision must
fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance of the commonlaw right as it existed in 1791.298
Prior to Markman, the Court had never extracted a subsidiary issue from
within a cause of action to determine if it alone had an historical analogue.
This approach could greatly enlarge what the Court has previously referred
to as an "abstruse historical inquiry," 299 and lead to a narrowing of the right

to a jury trial.
In applying the first prong of the traditional historical test-examining
the nature of the action-Justice Souter easily determined that a patent infringement action was an action at law: "[T]here is no dispute that infringement cases today must be tried to a jury, as their predecessors were more
295 Markman, 517 U.S. at 376 (quoting Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295
U.S. 654, 657 (1935)). As discussed supra notes 24-46 and accompanying text, the historical test
described by Justice Souter is actually of more recent vintage, having first been fully formulated
in 1935. The Wonson decision dealt only with the Re-Examination Clause of the Seventh
Amendment, and not with the Right to Jury Trial Clause. See supra note 31 and accompanying
text.
296 Markman, 517 U.S. at 376.
297 See id.

298 Id. (citations omitted).
299 Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
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than two centuries ago. '300 The Court did not consider the second prong of
the historical test-the more important remedy prong-apparently because
the first prong had already answered the question that an infringement action
was entitled to a jury trial. Thus, the first part of the analysis in Markman
appears reasonably consistent with the first strand of traditional Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence-the question of whether a cause of action is entitled to a jury trial is determined by whether it was "tried at law at the time
301
of the founding," or is analogous to an action tried at law at that time.
In the typical application of the historical test, if the right to a jury trial is
so clear that the remedy prong of the historical test need not even be considered, this would end the inquiry. Once the Court has determined that the
case is one that has a jury trial right, all disputed factual issues are determined by the jury.302 The only time the Court has engaged in parsing issues
is when equitable and legal issues have been joined in the same action, 30 3 or
when a claim consists of two discrete issues that would normally be brought
as two claims.3 4 None of these cases involved subsidiary issues important to
the ultimate determination of an action at law.
Justice Souter, however, did not conclude his analysis with the determination that the infringement action brought by Markman had a jury trial
right. Instead, he proceeded to the novel prong of his test, discussed below"whether a particular issue occurring within a jury trial (here the construc'30 5
tion of a patent claim) is itself necessarily a jury issue.
2.

The Substance of the Right to a Jury Trial

The Markman analysis stands at odds with the second strand of Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence, which requires the maintenance of the substance
of the jury trial right even though changes may occur in procedures and practices. Justice Souter attempted to fit his analysis within existing Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence by framing the second prong of his test as
"whether the particular trial decision must fall to the jury in order to preserve
300 Markman, 517 U.S. at 377; see Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987) ("To
determine whether a statutory action is more similar to cases that were tried in courts of law

than to suits tried in courts of equity or admiralty, the Court must examine both the nature of
the action and of the remedy sought. First, we compare the statutory action to 18th-century
actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity.").
301 Markman, 517 U.S. at 376.
302

There are some exceptions, of course. For example, in addition to the general rule that

courts alone construe written documents, courts also construe statutes, determine foreign law,
and decide jurisdictional questions. For discussions of the fact/law distinction, see generally
Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact,72 U. PA. L. REv. 111 (1924), James B.
Thayer, "Law and Fact"in Jury Trials, 4 HARV. L. REV. 147 (1890), and Weiner, supra note 259.
303 See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 470-73 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-11 (1958).
304 See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 569 n.6
(1990) ("The question whether the Seventh Amendment analysis requires an examination of the

nature of each element of a typical claim is not presented by this case. The claim we confront

here is not typical; instead, it is a claim consisting of discrete issues that would normally be
brought as two claims, one against the employer and one against the union.").
305

Markman, 517 U.S. at 377.
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the substance of the common-law right as it existed in 1791. ' '306 The words"preserve the substance of the common-law right"-tend to suggest that this
test fits within the second strand of traditional Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. The limitation--"as it existed in 1791"-is, however, a complete turnabout from the traditional approach used for the last century to preserve the
substance of the common law right. As discussed earlier in Part II, the
Supreme Court has frequently maintained that the aim of the Seventh
Amendment is not to preserve those matters of form and procedure that exright, which it has repeatedly
isted in 1791, but only the substance of the
307
function.
fact-finding
jury's
the
defined as
In Markman, Justice Souter turned this traditional analysis on its head
by declaring that the substance to be preserved was only what existed in
1791.308 Instead of taking the position that practices that have an effect on
the jury could be freely changed and adapted as long as the jury's fact-finding
role is preserved, Justice Souter returned to a highly formalistic approach.
He said that unless a specific subsidiary issue within a cause of action (or its
analogue) was decided by the jury in 1791, there was no Seventh Amendment
guarantee of a jury trial on that subsidiary issue. 30 9 In other words, instead of
adapting jury practices to present times while preserving the substance, Justice Souter stated that 1791 practices will determine if sending a particular
subsidiary issue to the jury was part of "the substance" of the jury trial right.
According to Justice Souter, if proof of the subsidiary issue going to the jury
in 1791 is not found, then there is no Seventh Amendment guarantee of a
jury trial for that issue.3 10 This is at odds with prior cases which have considand
ered modern practices and procedures as not limited by 1791 3practices
11
procedures, as long as the jury's fact-finding role is preserved.
An examination of the difference between the traditional view of the
substance of the jury trial right and the Markman view follows. This difference goes to the core of the Seventh Amendment guarantee: how do we
define the substance of the right which must be preserved?
306 Id. at 376.

307 A good summary of this position is found in the four Justice dissent in Dimick v.
Schiedt.
[T]his Court has often refused to construe [the Seventh Amendment] as intended
to perpetuate in changeless form the minutiae of trial practice as it existed in the
English courts in 1791.... [T]he Seventh Amendment guarantees that suitors in
actions at law shall have the benefits of trial of issues of fact by a jury, but it does
not prescribe any particular procedure by which these benefits shall be obtained, or
forbid any which does not curtailthe function of the jury to decide questions of fact
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 490-91 (1935) (Hughes, Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Stone then listed a number of novel jury practices, not known
to the common law, which had been approved by the Court, and concluded: "[b]ut this Court
has found in the Seventh Amendment no bar to the adoption by the federal courts of these novel
methods ... for they left unimpairedthe function of the jury, to decide issues offact." Id. at 492
(Hughes, Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis added).
308 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 377-78.
309 See id.
310 See id.
311 See supra Parts II.C and II.D.
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a. Difference Between Issues and Practices
In the previously cited line of cases which deal with preserving the "substance" of the jury trial guarantee,3 12 the changes approved by the Court with
regard to the jury trial were changes in practices or procedures, including, for
example, changes related to directed verdicts, 13 summary judgment,3 14 the
number of jurors,3 15 the use of auditors,3 16 partial new trials, 317 and setting
aside general verdicts and directing verdicts for a defendant on facts specially
found.3 18 None of these cases dealt with a subsidiary trial issue within a cause
of action where a jury trial right was guaranteed. With respect to subsidiary
trial issues, judges were expected to be able to tell the difference between
319
issues of fact and law, and send the disputed factual issues to the jury.
In Markman, Justice Souter referred to "construing a term of art following receipt of evidence" as a "mongrel practice. 3 20 By "mongrel," Justice
Souter appeared to mean "mixed," such as a mixed breed instead of a pure
breed. The reference could mean mixed in the sense of mixed issues of law
and fact, because the interpretation of patent claims is generally considered a
matter of law for the court, while the underlying factual issues have traditionally been decided by the jury when they are disputed and extrinsic evidence is
introduced to explain meaning. Thus, although Justice Souter refers to a
"mongrel practice," the focus is on a specific subsidiary trial issue, not on a
general trial practice such as a granting of summary judgment or judgment as
a matter of law.
Justice Souter noted that the question in Markman was "whether a particular issue occurring within a jury trial (here the construction of a patent
claim) is itself necessarily a jury issue."'321 By framing the issue in this manner, Justice Souter has changed the analysis. A traditional analysis would
have sorted out the factual issues from the legal issues in a "mongrel practice," so that the factual issues could be sent to the jury. As discussed below,
however, the Court in Markman held that even though the issue was a factual
one, and was a subsidiary issue within a cause of action that carried a jury
trial right, the issue nonetheless was to be viewed through the prism of his312 See supra note 248.

313
314
315
316

See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 395-96 (1943).
See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-21 (1902).
See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 158-60 (1973).
See Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309-10 (1920).

317 See Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498-99 (1931).
318

See Walker v. New Mexico & S. Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596-98 (1897).

319

This is not to say that fact/law distinctions are always clear and certain. Numerous

sources have discussed this subject. See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy Procedure and StateCreated Rights: The Lesson of Gibbons and Marathon, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 25, 44; David P.
Currie, Bankruptcy Judges and the Independent Judiciary, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 441, 452
(1983); S. Elizabeth Gibson, Jury Trials in Bankruptcy: Obeying the Commands of Article III

and the Seventh Amendment, 72 MINN. L. Rav. 967, 1041 n.347 (1988). In most cases, however,
judges have a fairly good sense of what issues should go to the jury. Prior to Markman, judges in
patent cases regularly sent issues of disputed terms of art in patent claims to the jury. See supra

notes 272, 280-285 and accompanying text.
320

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378 (1996).

321

Id. at 377.
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tory to determine if it must be heard by the jury. 322 This represents a substantial departure from traditional Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, and
raises a number of problems discussed below.
b. HistoricalAnalogy for Subsidiary Issue
Having framed the question as one requiring a determination of whether
the individual issue within a cause of action must be heard by the jury in
order to preserve the substance of the common law right, Justice Souter then
asserted that the "'substance of the common-law right' is ...

a pretty blunt

instrument for drawing distinctions." 323 He also stated that the Court has
tried to "sharpen" this instrument by referring to distinctions of substance
and procedure, or issues of fact and law. 324 Justice Souter then declared that
"the sounder course, when available, is to classify a mongrel practice (like
construing a term of art following receipt of evidence) by using the historical
method, much as we do in characterizing the suits and actions within which
they arise. ' 325 Thus, at least for a "mongrel practice," the definition of the
"substance" of the jury trial right appears to have changed. According to
Justice Souter's analysis, this "substance" now consists of whether the subsidiary issue had a jury trial right in 1791, or whether an, analogous issue had
such a right.
If not limited, this revised definition of the "substance" of the common
law right which is preserved by the Seventh Amendment could have an enormous impact on the role of juries. The broadest interpretation of this definition would permit any subsidiary issue to be decided by the judge as a matter
of law in any case in which parties could not establish that such issue went to
the jury in 1791. Such an interpretation could greatly expand litigation over
whether particular issues had a jury trial right in 1791. As discussed in Part
IV, however, this result does not appear to be the intent of the Court.
c. Problems with the Markman Definition of the "Substance of the
Common Law Right"
Markman's revised definition of "substance of the common-law right"3 26
is contrary to the second strand of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. Essentially, Justice Souter said the substance of the common law right consisted
of preserving for the jury only those subsidiary issues that were jury issues in
1791. The strand of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence dealing with the substance of the common law right, however, has never held that the practices
and procedures of 1791 provide the substance of the jury trial right. To the
contrary, the Court has noted the importance of changing and adapting such
practices to present times. It is difficult to reconcile the Court's traditional
jurisprudence holding that practices and procedures from 1791 should not
322 See id. at 378.
323 Id. (quoting TuU v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 (1987) (quoting Colgrove v. Battin,

413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973))).
324 See id.
325 Id.
326 See id
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limit current practices and procedures, as long as the fact-finding function of
the jury is not impeded, with the Markman view that 1791 jury issues will
determine whether a subsidiary issue must go to the jury.
A second problem with the analysis in Markman is that it places a heavy
burden on the party who seeks a jury trial, because that party must prove that
the issue went to the jury in 1791. In some instances, including certain patent
claims constructions, once the court decides the subsidiary issue, the case will
327
effectively be decided, thereby essentially removing the case from the jury.
In contrast, the traditional historical test for determining if a cause of action
was entitled to a jury trial imposed a much lighter burden. A party who
asserted a jury trial right yet could not locate an appropriate 1791 analogue,
could nonetheless assert on the basis of the remedy sought that the action was
one which carried a jury trial right. Unlike the case-in-chief, the subsidiary
issue is divorced from the question of remedy and has no such safe harbor. A
judge using the Markman analysis, if not satisfied that the subsidiary issue or
any analogous issue went to the jury in 1791, could take the issue from the
jury and decide it as a matter of law, regardless of its factual nature.
This raises the third major problem with the Markman analysis. Not
only is the historical determination of a jury right for a subsidiary issue divorced from the all-important remedy prong of the traditional historical test,
but also the "substance of the common-law right" appears in Markman to be
divorced from the all-important requirement of preserving the jury's factfinding role. To the extent that this primary function of the jury loses significance, the effectiveness of the Seventh Amendment's guarantee will similarly
decline. If judges are not limited by a fact/law distinction, they will be able to
allocate to themselves factual issues for whatever reason they choose, if it
cannot be proved that a particular issue (or its analogue) went to the jury in
1791.
The above discussion is based on the broadest possible interpretation of
the Markman decision. In fact, however, there are strong indications that the
Court did not intend to radically change its traditional Seventh Amendment
jurisprudence. First, the Markman analysis only discussed using the historical
test for a subsidiary issue when it was a "mongrel practice," that is, a subsidiary issue which has elements of both fact and law. Presumably, if the subsidiary issue was clearly a fact issue or a legal issue, it would be allocated to the
jury or the judge respectively, without the need to engage in a separate historical inquiry. Second, as discussed in Part IV, the reasoning in Markman
appears in large measure to be limited to the patent area. Third, the recent
Supreme Court decision of City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes,328 discussed in Part V, appears to reaffirm the primacy of the jury's fact-finding
role.
The Court in Markman clearly decided not to preserve the jury's role in
patent claim construction. The Court's unwillingness to do so is contrasted in
the next part with its protection and enlargement of the jury's role under the
327 See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
328

119 S. Ct. 1624 (1999).
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third strand of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, which dealt with the jury
trial right after the merger of law and equity.
3. Merger of Law and Equity
No one argues that any issue in Markman is an equitable one. The reason for considering the third strand of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence is
simply to compare the Court's concern for preserving the jury trial right for
factual issues common to both legal and equitable claims raised in the same
action, with its lack of concern for preserving the right in Markman. The
reasons for the Court's willingness to take factual issues from the jury is then
examined in connection with the fourth strand, deference to a congressional
statutory scheme involving public rights.
In terms of a comparison, it is clear that if the Court were dealing with
both an equitable issue and a legal issue in Markman, the right to a jury trial
would be preserved for all factual issues common to both claims. 329 In
Markman, however, the Court determined to take from the jury and allocate
exclusively to the trial judge a subsidiary issue that was part of an action at
law. Thus, the judge may determine as a matter of law disputed factual issues
concerning the meaning of a term of art in a patent claim, including weighing
evidence and determining the credibility of experts skilled in the art. In
many cases, the determination of these issues will effectively decide the ultimate issue of whether infringement has occurred, thereby completely denying a jury trial.330 This runs counter to the principled interpretation the
Court used when legal and equitable issues were joined in the same action:
when there is an adequate remedy at law, so that equitable issues do not need
to be tried first, the jury trial right for common issues of fact must be
331
preserved.
What seems missing in Markman is a concern for the preservation of the
jury trial right. In Beacon Theatres, the Court preserved the jury trial right
for "legal" issues by measuring adequacy of remedy in light of modern conditions, not those of 1791.332 The Beacon Theatres Court also observed that
"'any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized
with the utmost care."' 333 In Markman, on the other hand, it was the right
itself that was being scrutinized, not the curtailment of the right.
The Court's willingness to eliminate the jury's role in patent claims construction, while appearing inconsistent with its strong protection of the jury's
role vis a vis issues common to both legal and equitable claims, can perhaps
3 34
be explained in part by other concerns raised by the Court in Markman.
The apparent change in the Court's attitude toward the jury in Markman may
also be explained by considering the Court's deference to a congressional
329 See supra notes 181-195 and accompanying text discussing Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover.
330 In many cases, deciding the meaning of the claim will also determine the ultimate issue

of infringement. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
331 See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 501, 508-11 (1959).
332 See id. at 506-07.
333 Id. at 501 (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)).
334 See supra Part III.B.2.c.
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statutory scheme involving public rights, and by its deference to the Federal
Circuit.
4. Deference to a CongressionalStatutory Scheme
The fourth strand of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence developed by
the Court, that Congress can create a new statutory scheme involving public
rights and provide for adjudication without juries in a non-Article III forum,
does not appear, at least at first blush, to be pertinent to the Markman decision.335 In some ways, however, it is highly relevant to understanding the
result reached in Markman.
After Atlas Roofing and Granfinanciera, the Court's "historical" test
took on a third prong, which looked to the forum in which the dispute would
be resolved:
If, on balance, these two factors [historical analogue and remedy]
indicate that a party is entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment, we must decide whether Congress may assign and has
assigned resolution of the relevant claim to a non-Article III adjudi336
cative body that does not use a jury as factfinder.
The federal district and appellate courts are, of course, Article III courts.
On that ground alone the exception the Court has carved out for removing
juries from a non-Article III forum does not appear to apply. The Court's
lack of concern for preserving the jury trial right in Markman, however, may
be related to the fact that the patent law area appears to share certain characteristics with some of Congress's other statutory schemes involving public
rights. The Constitution specifically delegates to Congress the right to establish and regulate patents, and Congress has in fact created an elaborate regulatory scheme to govern patents.337 Patent law is entirely federal, and
Congress created the Federal Circuit as a specialized forum to hear, inter
alia, all patent appeals from district courts.3 38 A high degree of federal regulation is also evidenced by the fact that to practice before the United States
Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), all patent attorneys and patent
335 The Court made clear in Granfinancierathat an action that involved a private, pre-

existing common law right could not be denied a jury trial right. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54-55 (1989).
336 Id. at 42.

337 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This provision grants Congress the right "To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors

the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-375
(1994 & Supp. III 1998).
338 Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982 through the merger of the Court of Claims
and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982,

Pub. L. No. 97-164, §§ 127, 163, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. (96 Stat.) 25, 37, 49 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295 (1994), and 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1994)); H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 16-17 (1981). Patent appeals from all district court decisions are heard by the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit also

has jurisdiction over appeals in a number of other areas, including trademark decisions of the
Patent and Trademark Office, and final decisions of the Court of International Trade. See
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The FederalCircuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U.
L. Rnv. 1, 4 (1989) (discussing the first five years of the Federal Circuit's operation, and whether

it has achieved greater unity and coherence in patent law).
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agents must pass an examination regarding the patent system, and be registered with the PTO.339 Thus, patent law, having a number of unique, federally imposed features, more closely resembles federally regulated areas like
bankruptcy or OSHA, than essentially private rights areas such as contracts,
torts, or property.340 As discussed below, the Court's deference to the congressional statutory scheme involving patents, and particularly to Congress's
goal of seeking uniformity in patent interpretation, may have influenced the
decision in Markman.
In the Federal Circuit's decision in Markman, Judge Mayer, concurring,
suggested that certain Federal Circuit judges were engaged in a movement to
eliminate all juries in patent cases, and to remove patent disputes to nonArticle III courts:
[T]oday's action is of a piece with a broader bid afoot to essentially
banish juries from patent cases altogether ....

Indeed, this move-

ment would vest authority over patent disputes in legislative courts,
unconstrained by Article III and the Seventh Amendment. See In
re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 970 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (opinion dissenting
from order denying rehearing in banc) ("A constitutional jury right
to determine validity of a patent does not attach to this public grant.
Congress could place the issue of validity entirely in the hands of an
Article I trial court with particular expertise if it chose to do
so.").... [S]everal judges of the court have already advised that

they are aboard this campaign.341
Judge Mayer referred to a dissent by Judge Nies, in which two other judges
joined, opposing the Federal Circuit's denial of a rehearing en banc on the
grant of a mandamus petition directing the district court to reinstate plaintiff
Lockwood's jury demand. 34 2 Lockwood had brought an infringement action
against American Airlines's computerized reservation system, for violating
two of Lockwood's patents.34 3 American raised patent invalidity as a defense, and counterclaimed for a declaration that its activities were non-infringing, and alternatively, that Lockwood's patents were invalid. 344 The
339 See 35 U.S.C. § 31 (1994); 37 C.F.R. § 10.1-10.170 (1999).
340 The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994 & Supp.
III 1998), is a federal statute which created a statutory duty to rid the workplace of unhealthy or
unsafe working conditions. It permitted the federal government, proceeding before an administrative agency, to obtain abatement orders and impose civil penalties on any employer maintaining unsafe working conditions. In Atlas Roofing Co. v. OccupationalSafety and Health Review

Commission, 430 U.S. 442 (1977), the Supreme Court found the Seventh Amendment was not
violated by the denial of a jury trial in these enforcement proceedings. Id. at 460-61.
341 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J.,
concurring) (quoting In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Archer, C.J., Nies &
Plager, JJ., dissenting), vacated sub nom. American Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182

(1995)), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). Judge Mayer concurred in the judgment, but objected to the
Federal Circuit's view that patent claims should be construed exclusively by the court. See id. at
989-90.
342 See In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 980-81 (ATcher, C.J., Nies & Plager, JJ., dissenting).
343 See id. at 968. Because Lockwood ultimately withdrew his demand for a jury trial, the
Supreme Court's decision to vacate the Federal Circuit order was probably a result of finding the
issue moot.
344 See id.
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district court granted summary judgment to American on its claim of noninfringement, refused Lockwood an interlocutory appeal, and struck Lockwood's demand that the issue of validity of his patents be tried to a jury.345
In granting a rehearing on the prior grant of Lockwood's mandamus petition,
the Federal Circuit determined that even though the question of patent validity was a matter of law for the court, there was a right to a jury trial on the
3 46
underlying factual questions relating to patent validity.
It is in this context that Judge Nies strongly asserted that patents were
public rights, 347 and that "[a] constitutional jury right to determine validity of
a patent does not attach to this public grant." 348 Although Judge Nies's discussion was focused on the issue of patent validity, her argument, taken to its
logical conclusion, could virtually eliminate jury trials in patent cases. Because in her view, the patent grant involves a public right, and "Supreme
Court precedent holds that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to public
rights determinations," 349 then Congress arguably could assign patent infringement and validity cases to a specialized Article I forum and eliminate
350
jury trials altogether.
345 See id. at 968-69.

See id. at 972, 976, 980.
"This court has held that the issue of validity of a patent involves public rights, not
merely private rights. '[Tihe grant of a valid patent is primarily a public concern.'" Id. at 981
(Archer, CJ., Nies & Plager, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594,
604 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). It is not altogether clear, however, that a patent involves primarily a
public right rather than a private Qne, because the rights granted in the patent are to a private
patent holder. Nor is it clear that Congress could simply relabel a patent infringement action as
one for a non-jury administrative adjudication without running afoul of the Seventh Amendment. In Granfinancierathe Court said, "Congress cannot eliminate a party's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial merely by relabeling the cause of action to which it attaches and placing
exclusive jurisdiction in an administrative agency or a specialized court of equity."
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 61 (1988). The question is whether Congress
created "'a new cause of action, and remedies therefor, unknown to the common law,' because
traditional rights and remedies were inadequate to cope with a manifest public problem." Id.
(quoting Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442,461
(1977)). While patent law has long been a creature of statute, the jury trial right in a patent case
derives from common law and the guarantee of the Seventh Amendment. See Gregory D.
Leibold, Comment, In JuriesWe Do Not Trust: Appellate Review of Patent-InfringementLitigation, 67 U. CoLo. L. REv. 623, 628 (1996); Greg J. Michelson, Note, Did the Markman Court
IgnoreFact,Substance, and the Spirit of the Constitution in its Rush Toward Uniformity?, 30 Loy.
L.A. L. Rnv. 1707, 1714 (1997).
348 In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 983 (Archer, C.J., Nies & Plager, JJ., dissenting). In addition, in a foreshadowing of the Markman decision, Judge Nies declared that when an issue is an
issue of law, the underlying factual issues should be decided by the court. See id. at 987-89
(Archer, C.J., Nies & Plager, JJ., dissenting). In Lockwood the legal issue was patent validity; in
Markman it was claim construction. Each had underlying factual issues. Judge Nies asserted
that validity was a matter which affected the public, and for policy reasons favoring reasoned and
uniform decisions, the identification and resolution of underlying facts should be made by the
judge. See id. (Archer, C.J., Nies & Plager, JJ., dissenting).
349 Id. (Archer, CJ., Nies & Plager, JJ., dissenting).
350 Leibold suggests that in light of the tremendous power entrusted to a trial judge since
Markman, specialized Article I courts for patent infringement cases might be a good idea. "[I]t
would be wise to follow the lead of the bankruptcy courts and ensure that a trial judge who is
well versed in the law and subject matter of patents conducts the trial." Leibold, supra note 347,
at 648. Leibold suggests that an even more effective solution, however, would be for Congress to
346
347
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Although the Supreme Court in Markman did not explicitly mention
"public rights" as a reason for not applying the Seventh Amendment guarantee, the decision did note that Congress has created a special forum for patent appeals out of concern for increasing the uniformity necessary to
promote public interest in growth and industrial innovation.35' This desire
for uniformity in the patent area appeared to be quite important to some of
the Justices during the oral argument in Markman.352 Moreover, Justice Souter explained that "the importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given
patent [is] an independent reason to allocate all issues of construction to the
court. '353 He noted three reasons why the limits of a patent must be known:
"'for the protection of the patentee, the encouragement of the inventive genius of others and the assurance that the subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public."' 354 Otherwise, Justice Souter declared, "'a
zone of uncertainty ...would discourage invention" 355 and the "'public
[would] be deprived of rights supposed to belong to it, without being clearly
told what it is that limits these rights."' 356 The underlying assumption, of
course, is that there will be greater uniformity if judges rather than juries
construe patent claims, and if the Federal Circuit has de novo review of all
such constructions.
The Supreme Court's deference to the federally established patent system is particularly evident in its deference towards the Federal Circuit. Commentators have asserted that until recently, the Supreme Court was loath to
hear patent cases unless the cases focused upon issues other than patent doctrine. 357 The Court particularly preferred to leave issues involving technology to Federal Circuit judges, who had a high level of skill in this area as well
as the assistance of a staff of individuals specially trained in science and technology.35 8 As a court having specialized subject matter jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit possesses concentrated power, augmented by the Supreme
Court's reluctance to grant certiorari in patent cases. 359 In many instances,
override the Supreme Court's decision in Markman, and then authorize the use of "special ju-

ries" of highly educated individuals to decide factual issues in patent cases. See id. at 648-49.
351 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390-91 (1996); see also
Dreyfuss, supra note 338, at 7 ("According to proponents of the legislation, channeling patent
cases into a single appellate forum would create a stable, uniform law and would eliminate forum shopping.").
352 See Official Transcript of the Supreme Court of the United States at 33, Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (No. 95-26).
353 Markman, 517 U.S. at 390.
354 Id. (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938)).

355 Id. (quoting United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942)).
356 Id. (quoting Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1877)).
357 See Thomas K. Landry, Certainty and Discretion in Patent Law: The On Sale Bar, the
Doctrine of Equivalents, and JudicialPower in the Federal Circuit,67 S.CAL. L. REv. 1151, 1153

n.8 (1994).
358 In CardinalChemical Co. v. Morton International,Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 105 (1993), Justices

Scalia and Souter made known their preference for deferring to the Federal Circuit's expertise.
They declined to join in a part of the majority opinion which concerned "practicalities of the
Federal Circuit's specialized patent jurisdiction," preferring instead to accept the views of "the

experienced judges on the Federal Circuit." Id. at 105 (Scalia & Souter, JJ., concurring).
359 See Landry, supra note 357, at 1204.
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therefore, the Federal Circuit has become the court of last resort in patent
cases.

360

While the Supreme Court is clearly deferential to the technical expertise
and credentials of the Federal Circuit, there is doubtless also a tendency to

defer to its administrative expertise in managing the patent system. 361 Thus,
although the issue the Court decided in Markman was primarily a Seventh

Amendment issue, the Court may well have viewed it as affecting the Federal
Circuit's ability to manage the patent system, and been willing to defer to the

Federal Circuit on that basis. 362 Thomas Landry asserts that "[tlhe Supreme
Court's laissez-faire attitude has allowed the [Federal Circuit] to act like an
independent agency within the judicial branch," and that "[jlust as independent agencies perform specialized executive functions with only marginal accountability to the seat of executive power (the President), the [Federal
Circuit] performs specialized judicial functions with only marginal accounta'363
bility to the seat of judicial power (the Supreme Court).
In Markman, the Supreme Court gave the eight-judge majority in the
Federal Circuit decision exactly what it wanted: de novo review over patent
claims construed exclusively by judges. De novo review is the proper standard of review for questions of law. Since construction of patent claims was
determined to be entirely a matter of law, which therefore excluded underlying factual claims from the jury, any patent claim construed by any district
court in the country could be construed again by a Federal Circuit panel
3 64
without any deference to either the jury or the trial judge as finder of fact.

Providing that the trial judge would construe claims in their entirety as a
matter of law (with de novo review by the Federal Circuit) would, according

360 See David Silverstein, Patents, Science and Innovation: HistoricalLinkages and Implications for Global Technological Competitiveness, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 261, 310
(1991) ("An overburdened Supreme Court, routinely refusing to review patent cases, made it

inevitable that the [Federal Circuit] would wield far more power than many supporters of this
change had anticipated. For all practical purposes, the [Federal Circuit] has become the 'court of
last resort' in patent cases, and its holdings the 'law of the land.').
361 See Landry, supra note 357, at 1208-10.
362 There has been a substantial increase in the number of jury trials in patent -cases. See
Allan N. Littman, The Jury's Role in Determining Key Issues in PatentCases: Markman, Hilton
Davis, and Beyond, 37 IDEA 207, 209 (1997) (noting that juries were used in about 21% of
patent cases in 1981, increasing to 70% of patent cases by 1994 (citing ADmrISTRATvE OFFICE
OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE

UNITED STATES A1-79 tbl.C-4 (1994) (finding juries used in 71% of patent cases in 1994))). This
trend is expected to be reversed after Markman. Predictions have been made that Markman
may cause " [a]s many as 90 percent of [patent] cases [to] be decided on a motion for summary
judgment ....Steve D. Glazer & Steven J. Rizzi, Markman: The Supreme Court Takes Aim at
Patent Juries, J. PROPRIETARY RTs., May 1996, at 5 n.2 (quoting Victoria Slind-Flor, Ruling
Boosts Judges' Role in Patents, NAT'L L.J., May 6, 1996, at B1 (quoting Jack C. Goldstein, former
head of the American Bar Association's intellectual property law section)).
363 Landry, supra note 357, at 1211.
364 The standard of review for a jury verdict is whether it is supported by substantial evidence, and for a trial judge, whether the findings are clearly erroneous. See infra note 402 and
accompanying text.
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to the Federal Circuit, permit determination of "a true and consistent365scope
of the claims," which would benefit both patentees and competitors.
Excluding juries from construing patent claims was a result that the Federal Circuit clearly sought. Markman could have been decided on much narrower grounds. The evidence presented did not provide much support for
the interpretation Markman sought (that the term "inventory" could mean
either dollars or cash or invoices or articles of clothing). 366 Interestingly,
while the district court judge in Markman granted judgment as a matter of
law to Westview on claims 1 and 10, which the jury had decided in favor of
the plaintiff Markman, he did not disturb the jury's finding in favor of the
defendants on claim 14.367 The judge did not decide that the matter should
never have gone to the jury. Rather, he believed that claims I and 10 should
be decided by the court as a matter of law because the testimony did not raise
3 68
genuine issues of material fact.
Judge Rader focused on this last point in his concurring opinion in the
Federal Circuit's decision in Markman. To decide Markman, according to
Judge Rader, the Federal Circuit did not need to decide that all subsidiary
issues in all patent claims should be determined by the court as a matter of
law.369 Instead, Judge Rader asserted that the decision should be limited to
finding that judgment as a matter of law was properly granted to Westview
because no substantial evidence supported Markman's position.3 70 He commented emphatically that "[t]his court's extensive examination of subsidiary
fact issues is dicta .... [W]hether claim construction can involve subsidiary

'371
fact issues is not before us. It is our duty not to rule on this question.
The Federal Circuit was overreaching when it decided that all underlying
disputed issues of fact could be properly determined by a court alone-but it
went still further to state that a court must decide claim construction exclusively. 372 The Federal Circuit held that "in a case tried to a jury, the court has
the power and obligation to construe as a matter of law the meaning of language used in the patent claim. '373 In other words, the Federal Circuit did
not want a district court judge to have any discretion to permit a jury to
decide disputed terms of art if it seemed more appropriate to the district
judge under the circumstances to send the issue to the jury. According to the
Federal Circuit, the interpretation of such disputed underlying terms by the
court is not only permissible, but obligatory. This conclusion was necessary
in order for the Federal Circuit to retain de novo review in all litigation of
patent claims. In affirming the Federal Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court
granted the Federal Circuit's wishes, holding that "the construction of a pat-

365 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc, 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),
affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
366 See id. at 974.
367 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535, 1536 (E.D. Pa. 1991), affd,
52 F.3d at 989, affd, 517 U.S. at 391.
368 See id.

369
370
371
372
373

See Markman, 52 F.3d at 998 (Rader, J., concurring).
See id. (Rader, J.,
concurring).
Id. (Rader, J., concurring).
See id. at 970-71.
Id. at 979 (emphasis added).
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ent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province
of the court." 374
The Supreme Court's deference to the Federal Circuit and to the goals
of Congress in creating a statutory scheme for patent and patent administration, although not an exact fit within the "public fights" strand of the Court's
Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, nonetheless offers a more logical explanation of the Court's conclusion in Markman than any of the other jurisprudential approaches. 375 The Court's unspoken rationale appeared to be that
because the Federal Circuit wanted de novo review of all patent claims construction, which could be accomplished only if claims were construed solely
as a matter of law, de novo review was undoubtedly important to the Federal
Circuit's effective administration of the patent system. In addition, the Court
reasoned that because patent law is a highly specialized area, and consistency
in patent interpretation is necessary to the public interest,
judges rather than
376
jurors should construe the patent claim in its entirety.
In sum, while the Markman decision appears to be consistent with the
first strand of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, or at least with the first
prong of the historical test-considering whether the nature of the action is
one which would have had a jury trial right in 1791-the decision is inconsistent with the second and third strands because of the Court's willingness to
withdraw factual issues from the jury. Neither does Markman fit neatly
within the fourth strand-upholding congressional action creating non-Article III courts and administrative agencies that resolve matters of public right
without a jury-because patent jurisdiction remains in Article III courts.
Nevertheless, it may well be that the Court in Markman was willing to support a novel Seventh Amendment interpretation because its application was
limited to a specialized forum that dealt with a specialized subject matter
377
affecting public rights and entirely regulated by federal law.
C. Beyond the Seventh Amendment
At the beginning of Part III of the Markman decision, the Supreme
Court stated that the Seventh Amendment did not apply to claim construction because common law practice in 1791 did not require jury participation. 378 The Court then stated that it must "look elsewhere to characterize
this determination of meaning in order to allocate it as between court or
jury. ' 379 The three areas the Court determined to look at included the fol374

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).

375

Curiously, although the Supreme Court was entirely deferential to the Federal Circuit

by giving it exactly the result it sought, the Court was not deferential to the reasoning of the
Federal Circuit. The Supreme Court did not mention the Federal Circuit's analogy of a patent to
a statute, or the second line of authority of cases which the Federal Circuit claimed supported its

position.
376

See Markman, 517 U.S. at 387-90.

377

The Supreme Court, however, does not appear to believe that juries have no role in

patent litigation. See infra notes 421-431 and accompanying text.
378 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 384. "[E]vidence of common-law practice at the time of the
framing does not entail application of the Seventh Amendment's jury guarantee to the construction of the claim document ...." Id.
379 Id.
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lowing: "existing precedent,... the relative interpretive skills of judges and
juries and the statutory policies that ought to be furthered by the
380
allocation."
The question these statements raise is whether the Court's Seventh
Amendment analysis ended with Part II,
so that Part III is simply a discussion of other potential bases for allocation of issues between judge and jury,
or whether Part III is a continuation of its interpretation of the Seventh
Amendment.3 8' If the Seventh Amendment inquiry ended in Part II, with
the conclusion that there was no guarantee of a jury trial for a disputed issue
of fact in a patent case, then it would not appear necessary for the Court to
proceed further. If there is no jury trial right, the issue is left for the judge's
consideration. Because Justice Souter continued the inquiry in Part III, there
is at least the suggestion that he was continuing to analyze the applicability of
the Seventh Amendment jury trial right to the issue of claim construction.
There are a number of indications that this is not the case, however, and
that after deciding that the Seventh Amendment does not require a jury trial
on this particular issue, the Court simply turned to alternative means of determining the proper allocation between judge and jury. First, the language
itself at the end of Part II of the decision appears to categorically state that
the Seventh Amendment does not apply.382 The first paragraph of Part III
then indicates that other ways of deciding this issue will be considered. 38 3
Second, with the exception of the first paragraph of Part III, Justice Souter
never again mentions the Seventh Amendment in his discussion in Part III of
the various methods proposed for allocating an issue between judge and jury:
precedent, relative skills of judges and juries, and statutory policies that
384
would be furthered by the allocation.
The Court's discussion of precedent concerned how earlier cases handled patent claims and what commentators have said about questions of construction, but did not discuss the constitutional aspect of the question.385 The
Court's conclusion about the value of precedent seems rather confused, because it made two statements which appear somewhat contradictory. Initially, the Court concluded: "[O]ur precedent supports classifying the
380 Id.

381 Commentators have taken different views. Michelson says the policy arguments were
simply used to support the Federal Circuit's holding that claim construction is a matter of law.
See Michelson, supra note 347, at 1763. The author of an unsigned Harvard Law Review Note
seemed to believe Markman's discussion of functional considerations was part of the Seventh
Amendment analysis, but stated, "[u]nder one possible reading, the Court simply ended its Seventh Amendment analysis in Part II of the opinion, finding the constitutional guarantee to be
inapplicable." The Supreme Court1995 Term-Leading Case, 110 HARv. L. REv. 135, 276 n.81
(1996) (citations omitted).
382 "[O]ur conclusion [is] that the Seventh Amendment does not require terms of art in
patent claims to be submitted to the jury ...." Markman, 517 U.S. at 384 n.9.
383 "Since evidence of common-law practice at the time of the framing does not entail ap-

plication of the Seventh Amendment's jury guarantee to the construction of the claim document,
we must look elsewhere to characterize this determination of meaning in order to allocate it as
between court or jury." Id. at 384.
384 See id.

385 See id.at 384-91.
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question as one for the court. '386 Yet, later in the opinion the Court remarked that when "precedent provide[s] no clear answers, functional considerations also play their part in the choice between judge and jury to define
terms of art. '38 7 Thus, if one tried to reconcile these two conflicting state-

ments, it would appear that the Court's view is that although precedent provided some support for judges to decide patent claims, it did not provide a

clear answer to the question of proper allocation between judge and jury.
The Court therefore turned to functional considerations to answer the alloca-

tion question.
Justice Souter determined that "judges, not juries, are the better suited
to find the acquired meaning of patent terms. '388 He noted further that
"[t]he construction of written instruments is one of those things that judges
often do and are likely to do better than jurors unburdened by training in
claims of
exegesis" and that judges can better perform with respect to "the
389
patents [which] have become highly technical in many respects.
Functional considerations have never, of course, been a part of Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence. The reasons are steeped in history. The Seventh
Amendment was adopted by the Founders in part to protect against oppressive and corrupt judges. 390 Permitting a judge to determine that an issue
should be decided by the court rather than the jury brings to mind the proverbial fox guarding the chicken coop. Giving the court the power to determine on a functional basis if an issue should go to the jury would391essentially
abrogate the constitutional guarantee of the right to a jury trial.
386 Id. at 384 n.10.
387 Id. at 388.
388

Id.

389 Id. at 388, 389 (quoting William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularityin Pat-

ent Claims, 46 MicH. L. RPv. 755, 765 (1948)). There is empirical evidence which does not
support the Court's assumption that the jury is an inferior fact finder to the judge in scientific
matters. See Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Debate About Scientific
Evidence: A CloserLook at Juror"Incompetence" andScientific "Objectivity," 25 CoiNN. L. REv.
1083, 1094-98 (1993) (stating that empirical evidence does not support the view of juror incompetence, rather, increasingly, evidence indicates jurors competently decide complex issues); Kenneth R. Kreiling, Scientific Evidence: Toward Providing the Lay Trier with the Comprehensible
and Reliable Evidence Necessary to Meet the Goals of the Rules of Evidence, 32 ARiz. L. REv.
915, 930-35 (1990) (citing a number of studies that give jurors credit for good recall, comprehension, evaluation of expert testimony, and application of law to facts).
390 Thomas Jefferson described the jury as "the only anchor ever yet imagined ... by which
a government can be held to the principles of its constitution." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to

Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), in MARTIN A. LARSON,

JEFFERSON: MAGNIFICENT POPULIST

134

(1981); see also Wolfram, supra note 12, at 644 ("[I]t seems clear that one of the purposes of the
right of jury trial in civil cases is to place limitations upon judges."). Wolfram also concluded,
it is clear that the amendment was meant by its proponents to do more than protect
an occasional civil litigant against an oppressive and corrupt federal judgealthough it certainly was to perform this function as well.... The effort was quite
clearly to require juries to sit in civil cases as a check on what the popular mind
might regard as legislative as well as judicial excesses.
Wolfram, supra note 12, at 653.
391 In discussing the functional argument, Justice Souter cited Miller v. Fenton,474 U.S. 104
(1985), for the proposition that when an issue "'falls somewhere between'a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination
that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned
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The only indication that the Court might be willing to consider a functional approach to the allocation of matters between judge and jury appears
in dicta in a footnote in Ross v. Bernhard. There, the Court said "the 'legal'
nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-merger custom
with reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the
practical abilities and limitations of juries. ' 392 The Court never developed in
any other case, however, a functional approach to Seventh Amendment interpretation which considered "the practical abilities and limitations of juries," except with respect to administrative proceedings. 393 In Tull v. United
States, the Court referred to this understanding in a footnote, stating that
"[t]he Court has also considered the practical limitations of a jury trial and its
functional compatibility with proceedings outside of traditional courts of law
in holding that the Seventh Amendment is not applicable to administrative
proceedings. '394 Furthermore, in a footnote in Granfinanciera,the Court put
to rest any indication that it might apply a functional test to determine Seventh Amendment applicability. The Court specifically explained that the reference in Ross to "the practical abilities and limitations of juries" was a
contemplation of "whether Congress has permissibly entrusted the resolution
of certain disputes to an administrative agency or specialized court of equity,
and whether jury trials would impair the functioning of the legislative
scheme. 3 95 In Chauffeurs, a year after Granfinanciera,the Court, quoting
the language in Granfinanciera, reaffirmed that functional considerations
have never been relied upon by the Court as a basis for Seventh Amendment
396
applicability, referring to the above language in Granfinanciera.
It is unlikely that the Court, in the face of this clear precedent, would
then assert in Markman that the Seventh Amendment permitted the allocation of issues between judge and jury to be determined on a functional basis.
Rather, Justice Souter appeared to set forth the functionality argument as a
policy rationale for allocating an issue to the jury, only after having determined there was no constitutional requirement to be considered. If this is
than another to decide the issue in question."' Markman, 517 U.S. at 388 (quoting Miller, 474
U.S. at 114). The reference to the fact/law distinction made in Miller seems inappropriate in
Markman. First, Miller was a criminal case, dealing with a writ of habeas corpus to review the
question of voluntariness of a confession and whether the confession met the due process standards of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Miller, 474 U.S. at 105-08. There was no issue of
allocation between judge and jury, but rather a question of standard of review by the appellate
court of the trial court's findings. See id. at 109. The "judicial actors" referred to were the
appellate court and the trial court. See id. at 114. The Court determined that the standard was
one of independent review for legal questions rather than "presumed correctness" for factual
findings. See id at 115.
392 Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
393 See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442,
454 (1977); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974).
394 ThU v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,418 n.4 (1987) (citing Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 454).
395 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 n.4 (1989).
396 See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 n.4
(1990) ("We recently noted that this [functional] consideration is relevant only to the determination 'whether Congress has permissibly entrusted the resolution of certain disputes to an administrative agency or specialized court of equity, and whether jury trials would impair the
functioning of the legislative scheme."' (quoting Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42 n.4)).
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indeed the case, any arguments that Markman has created a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment are without merit, because the question
of whether judges or jurors are better suited to decide certain issues only
occurs after a court determines that the Seventh Amendment does not
397

apply.

Finally, the Court in Markman discussed the statutory policies that
would be furthered by the allocation of patent claim construction to the
judge. As noted above, the Court focused on the federal statutory scheme
designed to ensure uniformity in the treatment of patents, in order to
"'strengthen the United States patent system in such a way as to foster technological growth and industrial innovation."' 39 8 The Court's stated policy
reasons are consistent with its jurisprudential approach to non-Article III
courts that deal with "public rights," where it has deferred to a congressional
statutory scheme that does not provide for the right to a jury trial. The Court
did not, however, discuss Seventh Amendment applicability or non-applicability in this part of Markman. It framed its arguments instead as policybased, grounded in the congressional goal of uniformity in the treatment of
399
patents.
A better reading of Part III of the Markman opinion is that it does not
interpret the Seventh Amendment, but rather, attempts to bolster on policy
grounds the Seventh Amendment decision reached in Part 11.400 The need
for bolstering its decision to allocate claim interpretation to the judge is apparent in light of the fact that it is based on a novel application of Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence. Seventh Amendment jurisprudence has for over
a century imposed no impediment to developing modern jury practices and
procedures unrestricted by particular practices that were or were not followed in 1791. Until Markman, the Court repeatedly held that such changes
in practices and procedures were permitted, as long as they did not interfere
with the critical element which must be preserved-the jury's fact-finding
role in a common law suit. In Markman, however, the Court took a different
397 It would be ironic if Markman was determined to have created a complexity exception
to the Seventh Amendment. While undoubtedly some patent decisions involve complex issues,
the Markman question of what "inventory" means is not complex.

398 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 97-312, at 20 (1981)).
399 A number of commentators are not persuaded that the Markman decision will increase
uniformity. See Kevin W. King, Note, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc: The Jury's Diminishing Role in PatentLaw Cases, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1127, 1150 (1997) (stating that different district courts may reach contrary conclusions when construing a single patent in separate

infringement lawsuits, and "[d]ifferent panels of the Federal Circuit may disagree, creating an
intracircuit conflict which may or may not be resolved en banc or by the Supreme Court");
Leibold, supra note 347, at 644 ("Except where the same precise issue arises in subsequent litigation against another infringer... piecemeal, 'define-as-you-go' construction leaves patentees in
essentially the same position" as when juries decided claim construction); Michelson, supra note

347, at 1735 (stating that because other issues are still decided by the jury, claim construction by
a judge will not necessarily produce uniformity).
400 This is supported by the last sentence of footnote 9 in Part II of Markman, in which the

Court states unequivocally, before even considering the issues raised in Part III, "that the Seventh Amendment does not require terms of art in patent claims to be submitted to the jury."

Markman, 517 U.S. at 384 n.9.
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approach, resulting in the withdrawal of facts from the jury in patent claims
construction. In Part III of its decision, therefore, policy reasons appear to
be offered in support of a decision that seems otherwise inconsistent with the
strong federal policy favoring jury trials.
There may have been an additional reason why the Court bolstered its
decision with policy rationales. The Court's holding was that "the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within
the province of the court."' 401 If the decision had simply been that the Seventh Amendment does not require disputed terms of art in a claim to go to
the jury, a judge could still send the issues to the jury if it seemed appropriate
to do so. In Markman, however, the Court imposed on trial judges an obligation not to send these kinds of issues to the jury. The Court decided not only
that it was proper for a trial court to decide this issue, but that doing so was
mandatory. That result is not compelled, nor even supported by a finding
that the Seventh Amendment does not require a jury decision. It was, however, the result sought by the Federal Circuit. Imposing a requirement on
lower courts that goes beyond simply determining that the Seventh Amendment does not mandate a jury trial right on a particular issue represents an
activist stance by the Court. It is therefore not very surprising that the Court
would set forth policy rationales in support of its activist decision.
The reason the Federal Circuit wanted to have the claim construed
solely by the court was to permit it to have de novo review in each case.
Federal appellate courts use different standards to review appeals that come
before them, depending upon whether they are reviewing a finding of fact or
a finding of law. If reviewing a finding of fact, the court's standard may also
differ depending upon whether the fact finder below was the judge or the
jury. As Judge Mayer explained:
When a question of claim construction arrives here on appeal, this
court reviews the ultimate construction given the claims under the
de novo standard applicable to all legal conclusions. But any facts
found in the course of interpreting the claims must be subject to the
same standard by which we review any other factual determinations: for clear error in facts found by a court; for substantial evidence to support a jury's verdict. 402
Thus, in order for the Federal Circuit to have the complete de novo review it sought over patent claim construction, the trial judge would have to
decide any underlying disputed issues of fact as a matter of law. As a result,
the appellate judges of the Federal Circuit would then have de novo review
of factual issues, such as credibility determinations, traditionally considered
solely within the jury's province. 40 3 The Court acknowledged in Markman
that credibility determinations "are the jury's forte," but stated:
401 Id. at 372 (emphasis added). The Court made clear it was "treating interpretive issues
as purely legal." Id. at 391.
402 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J.,

concurring), affd, 517 U.S. at 391.
403 In discussing the functional argument, Justice Souter quoted Miller v. Fenton for the
proposition that when an issue "'falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple
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It is, of course, true that credibility judgments have to be made

about the experts who testify in patent cases, and in theory there
could be a case in which a simple credibility judgment would suffice

to choose between experts whose testimony was equally consistent
with a patent's internal logic. But our own experience with docuus doubtful that trial courts will run into
ment construction leaves
404
many cases like that.
This justification for requiring judges to make credibility judgments as a matnot a very satisfactory reater of law-that it will not happen very often-is
40 5
son for taking a factual issue from the jury.
To summarize, the Court did the following in Markman. First, it asked
whether the subsidiary issue of claim construction went to a jury in 1791.
Second, the Court determined that because there were no "claims" as such in
1791, the closest analogy was the specification. Because there was no established jury practice in 1791 for construing specifications, there was no constitutionally mandated jury trial right on the issue. 4°6 Third, the Court
historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of
the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide
the issue in question."' Markman, 517 U.S. at 388 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114
(1985)). However, Justice Souter did not cite one of the examples given by the Miller Court as
to when an appellate court should treat a trial court's finding as fact rather than law:
other considerations often suggest the appropriateness of resolving close questions
concerning the status of an issue as one of "law" or "fact" in favor of extending
deference to the trial court. When, for example, the issue involves the credibility of
witnesses and therefore turns largely on an evaluation of demeanor, there are compelling and familiar justifications for leaving the process of applying law to fact to
the trial court [as trier of fact] and according its determinations presumptive
weight.
Miller, 474 U.S. at 114.
404 Markman, 517 U.S. at 389. Of course, credibility determinations are not the only factual issues which now have to be determined by the court. Judge Newman outlined five major
areas in which disputed factual issues are likely to arise in connection with construing a patent
claim: (1) the specification ("[tihe ... specification contains the description of the invention,
including the claims"); (2) the prior art (prior art-is "what was known to persons in the field of
invention at the time the invention was made"); (3) the prosecution history (the public record in
the PTO of "what transpired during examination of the patent application"); (4) technologic/
scientific facts (questions of patent infringement may turn on findings of technologic or scientific
facts); and (5) the testimony of experts. Markman, 52 F.3d at 1002-05 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Judge Newman also expressed concern as to how the Federal Circuit was to find technological
facts:
Are we to read the entire record of the trial, re-create the demonstrations, decipher
the literature of the science and art; are we to seek our own expert advice; must the
parties be told the technical training of our law clerks and staff attorneys? No
amicus explained how improved technological correctness-that is, truth-would
be more likely to be achieved during the appellate process of page-limited briefs
and fifteen minutes per side of argument.
Id. at 1021 n.11 (Newman, J., dissenting).
405 At oral argument in Markman, the Court asked counsel for Westview how often confficting expert testimony was presented in a patent case on the meaning of the patent. Counsel
responded that conflicting expert testimony is presented "in virtually every case." Official Transcript of the Supreme Court of the United States at 33, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
517 U.S. 370 (1996) (No. 95-26).
406 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 380.
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concluded that because the Seventh Amendment did not require a jury trial
on the issue of claim construction, the Court must therefore determine on
other grounds whether underlying disputed issues of claim construction
should be decided by the judge or by the jury. 407 After finding no clear answer in precedent, the Court turned to functional considerations and policy
reasons for allowing the issue to be exclusively decided by the judge as a
matter of law.408
This is a dangerous approach to the Seventh Amendment if applied
outside the patent area. If no subsidiary factual issue had to be heard by a
jury unless an analogous issue was also heard by a jury in 1791, we would
soon have a significantly reduced jury trial right.40 9 Although we know generally which causes of action went to a jury in 1791, it could be difficult if not
impossible to establish whether each subsidiary issue within a particular
cause of action went to the jury in 1791. Under Markman, unless there is
proof that the subsidiary issue went to the jury in 1791, the court would be
free to apply a functional, policy-based analysis to determine whether the
judge or jury should decide the issue. For a number of reasons, however, it
appears as though the Court did not intend the reasoning in Markman to be
applied outside the patent area.
IV.

Markman's Inapplicability Outside of the PatentArea

The Markman decision has generated a large amount of scholarly comment, much of it critical. 410 Most commentators have discussed the impact of
Markman on patent law, and at least one commentator has analyzed the impact of Markman on other areas of the law.411 Although Markman has had a
major impact on patent litigation, there are three main reasons why it is unlikely to have significant precedential value outside of the patent law area:
(1) the specific limiting language of the decision, (2) inconsistency with the
Court's Seventh Amendment jurisprudence outside the patent area, and (3)
407 See id. at 384.

See id. at 388-91.
At oral argument in the Markman case, one of the Justices noted that, "[a] patent infringement is an action at law. And then you're going to take the issues one by one and take
them away from the jury, and pretty soon you'll have nothing triable to a jury." Official 'Ranscript of the Supreme Court of the United States at 45, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
517 U.S. 370 (1996) (No. 95-26).
410 See Leibold, supra note 347, at 671 (arguing that "the Supreme Court appropriated the
most important question in a patent-infringement suit for judges by recharacterizing claim construction as a matter of law, subject to de novo review," making the Markman decision "constitutionally troubling"); Michelson, supra note 347, at 1735 (stating that the "right to a jury
trial... should not [be diminished] ... because the court believes itself better suited to find
technological facts"); Louis S. Silvestri, Note, A Statutory Solution to the Mischiefs of Markman
v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 63 BROOK. L. Rnv. 279, 316 (1997) (stating that the Supreme
Court in Markman "wrongfully eliminat[ed] the well-established, defined differences between
trial judge and jury"); The Supreme Court 1995 Term-Leading Case, supra note 381, at 272-73
(stating that the Supreme Court in Markman, although reaching sound result, used flawed
analysis).
411 See, e.g., Joseph A. Miron, Jr., Note, The Constitutionalityof a Complexity Exception to
the Seventh Amendment, 73 CHi.-Kr L. REv. 865, 866 (1998).
408
409
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the unanimity of the decision, which suggests the Court viewed the decision
as quite narrow in its applicability.
A.

The Limiting Language of the Markman Decision

The Court observed that the Markman decision was limited to the patent area, saying, "[w]e need not in any event consider here whether our conclusion that the Seventh Amendment does not require terms of art in patent
claims to be submitted to the jury supports a similar result in other types of
cases. '4 12 The Court also noted, in rather convoluted language, that it was
not deciding "the extent to which the Seventh Amendment can be said to
have crystallized a fact/law distinction, or whether post-1791 precedent classifying an issue as one of fact would trigger the protections of the Seventh
Amendment if (unlike this case) there were no more specific reason for
413
decision."
In announcing what it was not deciding, the Court left for future decisions whether the fact/law distinction in 1791 is the only distinction that
should be recognized, or whether fact/law distinctions made after 1791 can
also trigger Seventh Amendment protections. Thus, while the Court did not
clarify the exact extent to which the Seventh Amendment mandates that certain issues be decided by the jury, by limiting its decision to the very narrow
patent law area, the Court intimated that a large remaining area is protected
by the Seventh Amendment. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the Court
would attempt to limit a fact/law distinction to one that existed in 1791, in
light of its consistent prior jurisprudence holding that the substance of the
Seventh Amendment must be preserved, not the forms existing in 1791.414
This ability to adapt and change, however, should not permit the relabeling
of issues of fact as issues of law for "functional" purposes, because doing so
would interfere with the jury's fact-finding function. 415 That fact-finding
function has consistently been found by the Court, outside the patent area, to
412 Markman, 517 U.S. at 383-84 n.9.
413 Id. at 384 n.10 (citations omitted).
414 See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390-91 (1943), where the Court stated:
The Amendment did not bind the federal courts to the exact procedural incidents

or details of jury trial according to the common law in 1791, any more than it tied
them to the common-law system of pleading or the specific rules of evidence then
prevailing. Nor were "the rules of the common law" then prevalent, including
those relating to the procedure by which the judge regulated the jury's role on

questions of fact, crystallized in a fixed and immutable system. On the contrary,
they were constantly changing and developing during the late eighteenth and early

nineteenth centuries.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
415 The Seventh Amendment requires "that questions of fact in common law actions shall

be settled by a jury, and that the court shall not assume directly or indirectly to take from the
jury or to itself such prerogative." Walker v. New Mexico & S. Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596

(1897). Even within the fourth strand of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, deference to a
congressional statutory scheme, there are limitations on simply relabeling an issue of fact as one
of law. "Congress cannot eliminate a party's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial merely by
relabeling the cause of action to which it attaches and placing exclusive jurisdiction in an admin-

istrative agency or a specialized court of equity." Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33,
61 (1989).
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be the substance of the Seventh Amendment right which must be
416
preserved.
B. Inconsistency with the Court's TraditionalSeventh Amendment
Jurisprudence
As noted above, the Markman decision is inconsistent with the second
and third strands of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence developed by the
Court outside the patent area, and does not neatly fit within the fourth
strand. The second prong of the Markman test-determining if a subsidiary
issue in a cause of action went to the jury in 1791-is a much more limiting
approach than the traditional second strand of the Court's jurisprudence
which focuses on preserving the jury's role as fact finder. The fact/law distinction, which has traditionally been the critical element preserved by the
Court, was ignored in Markman in favor of a formalistic search for a nonexistent historical analogue.
Markman is also inconsistent with the underlying principles of the third
strand of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence involving the merger of law and
equity. In cases in which both equitable and legal issues are involved, the
Court's decisions have protected and expanded the right to a jury trial of the
issues common to both claims.417 While there were no equitable issues in
Markman, rather subsidiary factual issues underlying a legal cause of action,
the Court was far less protective of the jury trial right for subsidiary issues in
an action at law than of legal issues combined with equitable issues.
It is the fourth strand of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence which appears most able to explain the result in Markman. This strand describes the
Court's deference to a congressional statutory scheme affecting public rights.
The limitation on the jury trial right created by this strand suggests an explanation for the result obtained in Markman. The Court appeared to view the
specialized forum of the Federal Circuit, which will have the power of de
novo review for decisions made by trial courts on patent construction claims,
as well as the congressional desire for uniformity in patent law, as justifications for requiring judges rather than juries to decide disputed factual issues
underlying patent claims.
Because of these special circumstances, however, it is highly unlikely
that the Court would be as willing to withdraw factual issues from the jury in
areas outside .of patent law. As the Court noted in Atlas Roofing and
Granfinanciera,public rights do not typically include common law rights such
as torts, contracts, and property. 418 Thus, it seems unlikely that the Court
would apply its reasoning in Markman to issues in these other areas which
mainly involve private rights.
416 "Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so
firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury
trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care." Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
417 See supra notes 181-195 and accompanying text.
418 See supra notes 228, 249 and accompanying text.
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Unanimity of the Decision

The unanimity of the Markman decision also suggests that the Court
intended its approach to be limited mainly to the patent area. The fact that
no Justice felt compelled to dissent or even to concur separately indicates
that the Court did not believe anything very significant was changed by
Markman regarding the Court's general approach to Seventh Amendment
jurisprudence. Rather, the Court had simply decided that in construing patent claims, trial courts and the Federal Circuit should have more power to
decide underlying disputed factual issues.
Markman's unanimity contrasts sharply with some prior Seventh
Amendment decisions, in which Justices have passionately dissented whenever the Court has either expanded or contracted the Seventh Amendment
jury trial right.419 That the Justices care strongly about the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial can be seen in these dissents. Thus, the failure of
any Justice to raise a dissenting voice supports the view that the Justices did
not regard their decision as bringing about any substantial changes in Seventh Amendment jurisprudence.
V.

Post-Markman Cases

Since Markman, the Supreme Court has decided three cases affecting
the jury trial right: Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., and City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes.4 20 These three cases appear to confirm that any change in Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence caused by the Markman decision did not have
major significance outside of the narrow area of patent claim construction.
A.

Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.

In Warner-Jenkinson, a patent infringement suit, the Court considered
the doctrine of equivalents. 421 This doctrine permits a finding of infringement even in the absence of literal infringement "if there is 'equivalence'
between the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention." 422 The patent holder in Warner-Jenkinson
was a dye manufacturing company which had a patent for a purification pro419 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(dissenting from majority holding that use of offensive collateral estoppel did not violate petitioners' Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 166 (1973)
(Marshall & Stewart, JJ.,
dissenting) (rejecting majority view upholding six person jury in civil
case); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500,511 (1959) (Harlan, Whittaker, and Stewart, JJ., dissenting) (protesting Court's holding that Seventh Amendment required jury trial for
legal rights tried with equitable rights); Galloway, 319 U.S. at 396 (Black, Douglas, and Murphy,
JJ., dissenting) (objecting to majority's sanctioning the expanded use of directed verdicts).
420 A fourth case, Hetzel v. Prince William County, 523 U.S. 208 (1998) (per curiam), was
decided per curiam under the Re-Examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment. The Court
reversed a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to reduce a damage
award without granting plaintiff a new trial. The Hetzel decision was consistent with the Court's
traditional view of remittitur.
421 See Warnei-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997).
422 Id.
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cess involving "ultrafiltration." 423 The process operated at pH levels between
approximately 6.0 to 9.0.424 When a second company developed an ultrafiltration process which operated at a pH of 5.0, the patent holder asserted
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, while acknowledging that
there was no literal infringement. 4 25
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, determined that the doctrine of
equivalents was alive and well, having survived the various revisions of the
Patent Act of 1952,426 and that the doctrine must be applied to each individual element of the claim as opposed to the invention as a whole. 427 One issue
before the Court was whether the judge or the jury should apply the doctrine
of equivalents. The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, had held that applying
the doctrine was a task for the jury: "Infringement, whether literal or under
the doctrine of equivalents, is a question of fact. '428 The Supreme Court
asserted that it was not necessary to decide the jury issue in order to resolve
the question before the Court.429 Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged that
there was "ample support in [its] prior cases" to support the Federal Circuit's
holding, and concluded that "[n]othing in our recent decision in Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc. necessitates a different result than that reached by
'430
the Federal Circuit.
The fact that the Court, while asserting that it was not deciding the issue,
nonetheless indicated its approval of the Federal Circuit's allocation of this
task to the jury, indicates either its support for the jury, or its deference to
the Federal Circuit. The Court left open, however, the possibility that it
might reach a different conclusion if the issue were squarely presented to
it. 431 This decision suggests at the very least, however, that for the foreseeable future, disputed infringement issues, including equivalence issues, will
remain within the province of the jury.
B. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.
In Feltner, Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, determined that the
petitioner in a copyright case had a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial
on the amount of statutory damages, despite language in the statute indicating that Congress had assigned this task to the court. 432 The copyright violation occurred after Feltner's three television stations, to which Columbia
423 See id.
424 See id. at 22.
425 See id. at 23.

426 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-357 (1994 & Supp. III 1998).
427 See Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 25-29.
428 Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(en banc) (per curiam), rev'd, 520 U.S. at 41.
429 See Warner-Jenkinson,520 U.S. at 38-39.
430 Id. at 38.
431 See id. at 39.
432 See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 342 (1998). Section
504(c) of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999), provides
that a copyright owner can recover "instead of actual damages..., an award of statutory damages ... in a sum of not less than $500 or more than $20,000 as the court considers just." 17
U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).
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Pictures Television ("Columbia") had licensed the rights to several television
series, failed to pay royalty fees. 433 Columbia terminated the license agreements, but Feltner's stations continued to run the series. 434 The trial court
entered summary judgment for Columbia on the copyright claims, and Columbia then exercised the option provided by section 504(c) of the Copyright
Act of 1976435 to recover statutory damages in lieu of actual damages. 436 The
trial court denied Feltner's request for a jury trial on the issue of statutory
damages, and determined after a two-day bench trial that (1) each airing by
each station of each show was a separate violation, (2) there were 440 acts of
infringement, and (3) the acts were willful. 437 The judge therefore fixed the
damages at $20,000 per infringement, for a total statutory damage amount of
$8,800,000.438 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("Ninth Circuit") affirmed, concluding that "the Seventh Amendment does not provide a
right to a jury trial on the issue of statutory damages because an award of
such damages is equitable in nature." 439
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the Seventh
Amendment required a jury trial on the amount of statutory damages. The
Court determined that the Seventh Amendment's command overrode the
language of section 504(c), which provided that statutory damages were to be
assessed in an amount that "'the court considers just."'440
In Feltner, the Supreme Court appeared to once again reaffirm its traditional Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. It began its analysis by setting
forth the traditional historical test: "To determine whether a statutory action
is more analogous to cases tried in courts of law than to suits tried in courts
of equity or admiralty, we examine both the nature of the statutory action
and the remedy sought."'441 In examining the historical background of copyrights, the Court noted that there were close analogues in 1791, because prior
to the adoption of the Seventh Amendment "the common law and statutes in
England and this country granted copyright owners causes of action for infringement. More importantly, copyright suits for monetary damages were
tried in courts of law, and thus before juries." 442 Rejecting Columbia's assertion that statutory damages were equitable in nature, the Court found that an
award of statutory damages served "purposes traditionally associated with
legal relief, such as compensation and punishment." 443 The Court also noted
the overwhelming evidence indicating that the consistent practice at common
law was for juries to award damages. 4" As discussed earlier, the Court dis433 See Feltner, 523 U.S. at 342.
434 See id. at 342-43.

435 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101.
436 See Feltner,523 U.S. at 343.
437 See id at 344.
438 See id.

439 Id. at 345 (quoting Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broad., 106 F.3d 284, 293
(9th Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. at 355.
440

Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)).

441

Id. at 348.

442

Id- at 348-49.

443
444

Id at 352.
See id.
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tinguished the part of Tull which had held that the amount of civil penalties
should be determined by the court, and found this allocation to be in tension
with other Supreme Court decisions, and also arguably dicta.445
The Court's decision in Feltner reflected its traditional Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. The Court applied the historical test in a manner consistent with the first strand of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, looking at
both the nature of the action and the remedy sought to determine if there
was a right to a jury trial. The decision was also consistent with the second
strand, which emphasizes the importance of preserving the jury's fact-finding
role. The Feltner Court cited with approval its view from Dimick v. Schiedt
that the determination of damages is a factual question "'peculiarly within
the province of the jury." 446 Finally, Feltner was consistent with the fourth
strand of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, in that it was not unduly deferential to Congress, because this was not a situation involving administrative
proceedings or matters of public rights. In Feltner, Congress's attempt to require a court to decide a matter traditionally within the province of the jury
was found to violate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.
C. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes
Unlike Markman and Warner-Jenkinson, which were decided unanimously, and Feltner,in which Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, City
of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes was a highly fractured decision. Four Justices dissented and one Justice concurred with the plurality in all but one part
of the opinion. 447 The dispute concerned whether a party in an inverse condemnation case, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, had a right to a jury trial.4 48
Del Monte Dunes ("Del Monte") owned beachfront property in the city
of Monterey, where it wanted to develop housing units. 449 Each time Del
Monte or its predecessor in interest had submitted plans to the city, the plans
had been rejected. 450 Each new plan submitted by Del Monte was prepared
in light of the city's prior objections, which changed from plan to plan and
which always became more rigorous.451 Finally, "[a]fter five years, five formal decisions, and nineteen different site plans," Del Monte concluded that
the city would not permit it to develop the property under any circumstances. 452 Del Monte then brought suit against the city under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging, inter alia, a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and an uncompensated and
therefore unconstitutional regulatory taking. 453
445 See supra notes 159-165 and accompanying text.
446 Feltner, 523 U.S. at 353 (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)).
447 See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. 1624 (1999). The Court was
unanimous as to Parts I and II of Justice Kennedy's opinion, but Justices O'Connor, Souter,

Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented from Parts III and IV, and Justice Scalia, who concurred generally, did not join in Part IV-A-2.

448 See id. at 1631; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. III 1998).
449 Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. at 1631.
450 See id.

451 See id. at 1632.
452 Id. at 1633.
453

See id The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be taken for
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The district court submitted the takings and equal protection claims to
the jury, but reserved for itself the decision on the substantive due process
claim. 454 The jury found in favor of Del Monte on both the takings and equal
protection claims, and awarded damages in the.amount of $1.45 million. 455
The district court then found in favor of the city on the substantive due process claim, and stated that this ruling was not inconsistent with the jury verdict.456 The court denied the city's motions for new trial and for judgment as
a matter of law. 457 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, addressing only the takings
claim, because upholding the verdict on that claim was sufficient to support
458
the award of damages.
The Supreme Court affirmed in a plurality decision in which Justice
Scalia concurred to make a majority, except as to Part IV-A-2. One of the
three questions presented by the city in its petition for certiorari was
"whether issues of liability were properly submitted to the jury on [Del
Monte's] regulatory takings claim." 459 The Supreme Court found that the
issues were properly submitted to the jury, holding that "a § 1983 suit seeking
legal relief is an action at law within the meaning of the Seventh Amendment. '460 The Court found that since section 1983 provided relief for invasions of a right protected under federal law, it essentially created a kind of
tort liability. 461 Moreover, the damages Del Monte sought for the unconstitutional denial of compensation for a regulatory taking constituted legal relief. 462 Because Del Monte's "suit sounded in tort and sought legal relief, it
463
was an action at law.)
Part IV-A-2 of Justice Kennedy's opinion failed to gain the support of
Justice Scalia. Justice Kennedy, writing for the plurality, stated that the city
was asking the Court to create an exception for takings claims brought via a
section 1983 action. 464 The city had argued that because it was well settled
that eminent domain claims had no jury trial right, and because there was no
significant difference between an eminent domain claim and Del Monte's
section 1983 takings claim, there should be no jury trial right on Del Monte's
section 1983 takings claim. 465 The plurality distinguished eminent domain
public use without just compensation. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment has been applied to the states as part of the meaning of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. amend. XIV, § 1. Therefore an uncompensated
takings claim is brought under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
454 See Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. at 1633.
455 See id. at 1634.
456 See id
457 See id.
458

See id.

459

Id. at 1635. The other two questions were "(2) whether the Court of Appeals impermis-

sibly based its decision on a standard that allowed the jury to reweigh the reasonableness of the
city's land-use decision, and (3) whether the Court of Appeals erred in assuming that the roughproportionality standard... applied to this case." Id.
460 Id. at 1638.
461 See id
462 See id. at 1638-39.
463

Id. at 1639.

464

See id.

465

See id. The Court noted that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had
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proceedings (condemnation proceedings) from the instant case on two
grounds. First, when the government initiates condemnation proceedings,
the question of liability is admitted; the only issue is the amount of damages.
Thus, such proceedings do not determine legal rights.466 On the other hand,
in an inverse condemnation case like the one before the Court, there is a
legal right in controversy. 467 Further, according to the plurality, in an inverse
condemnation suit the landowner has the greater burden because it must
"'discover the encroachment and... take affirmative action to recover just
468
compensation."
A second fundamental difference, according to the plurality, is that in a
condemnation proceeding, when the government has taken property for a
public use, it is acting in a lawful manner because it is providing the landowner with a forum to obtain just compensation, as required by the Constitution.469 In the instant case, however, according to the plurality, Del Monte
"was denied not only its property but also just compensation or even an adequate forum for seeking it."470 For this reason, the plurality concluded that
the action was analogous to common law tort actions to recover damages for
471
interference with property interests.
Justice Scalia refused to join the plurality in Part IV-A-2 of the opinion
because he viewed the jury trial right issue as being solely determined by the
section 1983 action, as long as money damages were sought. 472 Thus, he saw
no purpose in distinguishing condemnation actions from inverse condemnation actions because, for him, the underlying actions were irrelevant. Justice
Scalia described a section 1983 action as a prism through which many different lights may pass. In analyzing the cause of action for Seventh Amendment
purposes, his view was that "the proper focus is on the prism itself, not on the
'473
particular ray that happens to be passing through in the present case.
Justice Souter, writing a dissent joined by three other Justices, concluded
that there was no right to a jury trial. 474 In the dissent's view, an inverse
condemnation action was not significantly different from a direct condemnation action. 475 The dissenters found well-settled law that there is no right to a
jury trial in a direct condemnation action, even though it is characterized as
an action at law. 476 Justice Souter also disagreed that a takings action is
analogous to a common law tort action.477 He concluded that damages are
not awarded in an inverse condemnation action for tortious conduct, but
found there was no right to a jury trial on a takings claim brought under section 1983. See id.
(citing New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 95 F.3d 1084, 1091 (11th Cir. 1996)).
466 See id. at 1639-40.
467 See id. at 1638-39.
468 Id. at 1640 (quoting United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980)).
469 See id. at 1641.
470 Id.
471 See id.
472 See id. at 1645 (Scalia, J., concurring).
473 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
474 See id. at 1650 (O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
475 See id. at 1650-51 (O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
476 See id. at 1650-52 (O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
477 See id. at 1655 (O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
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rather as "'just compensation' required by the Constitution for payment of
an obligation lawfully incurred." 478
The above summary is a simplified synopsis of a lengthy and complex
decision. It is background for a discussion of the plurality's analysis and application of the Seventh Amendment in Parts IV-A-1 and IV-B, in which
Justice Scalia joined, creating a majority. The analysis, which at a superficial
level appears to follow Markman, in fact deviates substantially from the
Markman approach and more closely resembles traditional Seventh Amendment jurisprudence.
In the introductory paragraphs of Part IV, Justice Kennedy, writing for
the majority, determined that the statutory language of section 1983 did not
require a jury trial, and that therefore the Court must reach the Seventh
Amendment issue.479 He then quoted verbatim the Markman test of Seventh
Amendment applicability:
[W]e ask, first, whether we are dealing with a cause of action that
either was tried at law at the time of the founding or is at least
analogous to one that was. If the action in question belongs in the
law category, we then ask whether the particular trial decision must
fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance of the commonlaw right as it existed in 1791. 480
Although the first prong of Markman's test did not include the remedy
prong of the traditional historical test, Justice Kennedy considered the remedy as an important element in analogizing a section 1983 action seeking
legal relief to a common law tort action. He stated that "[o]ur settled understanding of § 1983 and the Seventh Amendment thus compel the conclusion
that a suit for legal relief brought under the statute is an action at law." 481
Justice Kennedy concluded that because Del Monte's suit was analogous to a
common law action and sought legal relief, it was an action at law.4 82 Thus,
although he quoted the Markman version of the historical test, Justice Kennedy applied traditional Seventh Amendment jurisprudence by considering
both the nature of the action and the remedy sought.
In Part IV-B, Justice Kennedy moved to the second prong of the
Markman test, but used a phrasing somewhat different than the Markman
language. Rather than asking "whether the particular trial decision must fall
to the jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right as it
existed in 1791," 48 Justice Kennedy asked "whether the particular issues of
liability were proper for determination by the jury. '14 8 4 He further noted that
"[i]n actions at law, issues that are proper for the jury must be submitted to it
'to preserve the right to a jury's resolution of the ultimate dispute,' as guaran478 Id. at 1657 (O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).

See id. at 1637-38.
Id. at 1638 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996)).
481 Id.
482 See id.
483 Markman, 517 U.S. at 376.
479
480

484

Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. at 1642 (citing to the entire Markman decision generally).
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teed by the Seventh Amendment. '48 5 This is quite different from the narrower Markman formulation. In the Markman test, the substance of the jury
trial right depended upon what existed in 1791. If the "trial decision," or an
analogue, did not go to the jury in 1791, it was not a part of that substance,
and thus the jury trial right need not be preserved by the Seventh Amendment. Justice Kennedy's formulation appears more generic: if the issue is of
the kind that is proper for jury resolution, then it must go to the jury to
preserve the jury trial right. This sounds more like the traditional second
strand of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, where the court has repeatedly
held that factual issues must go to the jury to preserve the substance of the
jury trial guarantee.
Just as in Markman, no precise historical analogue was found in Del
Monte Dunes for the specific test of liability submitted to the jury. Justice
Kennedy noted, however, that in common law suits for money damages
sounding in tort, questions of liability were determined by the jury.48 6 He
concluded, "[t]his allocation preserved the jury's role in resolving what was
often the heart of the dispute between plaintiff and defendant. '48 7 While this
conclusion might seem to be final, Justice Kennedy and the majority did not
find it to be so, concluding that "these general observations" provided only
"some guidance on the proper allocation between judge and jury. ' 48 8
Next, Justice Kennedy considered precedents, finding these also were
not definitive. 48 9 He then turned to "considerations of process and function."490 This discussion focused on the firm historical foundation of allocating predominantly factual issues to the jury. Justice Kennedy concluded that
this allocation served "'to preserve the right to a jury's resolution of the ultimate dispute."' 491 He noted that the Court had previously described determinations of liability in regulatory takings cases as ""'essentially ad hoc,
factual inquiries."'" 49 Justice Kennedy then discussed the two specific issues
of liability under consideration, and found that both were factual issues
proper for the jury.4 9 3 The first issue was the easier to determine: "whether a
landowner has been deprived of all economically viable use of his pr6perty is
a predominantly factual question" 494 and therefore proper for the jury. The
second issue dealt with "whether a land-use decision substantially advances
legitimate public interests within the meaning of [the Court's] regulatory takings doctrine. '495 Justice Kennedy found this issue to be a mixed question of
fact and law, and thus presented a more difficult question for the Court.496
485 Id. (quoting Markman, 517 U.S. at 377).
486 See id. at 1643.
487 Id.

488 Id.

489 See id.
490 Id. at 1643-44.
491 Id. (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377 (1996)).
492 Id. at 1644 (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1015 (1992)
(quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978))).
493 See id.
494 Id.
495 Id.

496 See id.
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Justice Kennedy refined the second issue to the narrower question actually
presented to the jury, "whether ...the city's decision to reject a particular
development plan bore a reasonable relationship to its proffered justifications.''497 Ultimately, the majority agreed with the Ninth Circuit that this
narrower question was "'essentially
fact-bound [in] nature,"' and held it was
498
properly submitted to the jury.

Although the majority did not make clear exactly what it meant by "process and function," it stated in that regard that "[i]n actions at law predominantly factual issues are in most cases allocated to the jury. ' 4 99 In comparing
the Seventh Amendment analysis used in Markman and in Del Monte Dunes,
perhaps the most interesting difference lies in the use of "function" in each
case. In Markman, the Court described "functional considerations" as the
basis for determining whether judges or juries were better qualified to construe patent claims. 50 Judges won. In Del Monte Dunes, at the same stage of
its analysis, the majority turned to "process and function" and determined
that because factual issues are in most cases allocated to juries, and because
the issues in question were predominantly factual, the issues should go to the
jury.501 In Markman, the use of precedent, function, and statutory policies
for determining the allocation of an issue between judge and jury seemed to
be separate from the Seventh Amendment analysis, because the discussion of
those considerations occurred only after an unequivocal finding that "the
Seventh Amendment does not require terms of art in patent claims to be
submitted to the jury."5 02 In Del Monte Dunes, although not entirely clear, it
appears that the discussion of precedent, function, and process was part of
the Seventh Amendment analysis itself. The majority found that while history gave some guidance on whether pertinent issues should go to the jury,
that guidance was not definitive. It was therefore necessary to consider precedent, function, and process. Yet the "function" considered in Del Monte
Dunes was nothing like the "functional considerations" discussed in
Markman. The majority in Del Monte Dunes made no effort to determine if
judges or juries were better suited to determine particular issues. Rather, the
majority noted that because the issues were factual, they should properly be
50 3
submitted to the jury.
497 Id.
498 Id. (quoting Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1430 (9th Cir. 1996),
affd, 119 S. Ct. at 1645).

499 Id. at 1643 (citing Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654,657 (1935)).
500 See supra notes 388-397 and accompanying text.
501 See Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. at 1643.
502 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 n.9 (1996).

503 It is not surprising that Justice Souter, the author of both the Markman decision and the
Del Monte Dunes dissent, continued to assert that functional considerations regarding whether
judge or jury is better suited to make a decision, should be used and should weigh in favor of the
judge. Asserting that a takings case was essentially an issue for the court, Justice Souter stated:

"Scrutinizing the legal basis for governmental action is 'one of those things that judges often do
and are likely to do better than juries unburdened by training in exegesis."' Del Monte Dunes,

119 S.Ct. at 1660 (O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Markman,
517 U.S. at 388).
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Justice Scalia's concurring opinion adopted a view of Seventh Amendment applicability compatible with traditional jurisprudence. He stated: "I
agree with the court's methodology, which, in the absence of a precise historical analogue, recognizes the historical preference for juries to make primarily factual determinations and for judges to resolve legal questions." 504
Thus, the majority in Del Monte Dunes, while paying lip service to
Markman, in fact applied a much more traditional approach to the Seventh
Amendment. The recognition of a jury trial right in a section 1983 takings
action was based in large measure on the historical importance of the fact/law
distinction as a fundamental basis for allocation of issues to the jury.
Conclusion
While Markman appears to contain a rather different approach to the
Seventh Amendment than that traditionally used by the Supreme Court, subsequent cases do not suggest that any radical change has taken place. Yet, it
is a bit disturbing when comparing Markman with the recent case of Del
Monte Dunes to find that the application of two different Seventh Amendment methodologies appears to have been necessary to produce two different
results. In other words, if the Seventh Amendment methodology applied in
Del Monte Dunes had been applied in Markman, with a similar emphasis on
the fact/law distinction and the importance of sending factual issues to the
jury, Markman would have turned out differently. The Court in Markman
did not deny that there were factual issues associated with patent claim construction; it simply declared that any pertinent facts would be decided by the
court as a matter of law. Conversely, if the Seventh Amendment methodology expounded in Markman had been applied in Del Monte Dunes, the result
also would have been different. There would have been no emphasis on the
fact/law distinction, and Justice Souter's view that judges are better equipped
than juries to decide these issues would have resulted in an allocation of
-these issues to the court.
This inevitably suggests the possibility that the current Seventh Amendment methodology is simply result oriented-that the Justices determine the
result they want to reach and devise a methodology for arriving at that result.
If true, this would be unfortunate. If the Seventh Amendment guarantee is
so malleable that any desired result can be obtained by changing methodology, then the Amendment's usefulness is diminished. On the other hand,
although the Markman analysis, which removes facts from the jury, seems
like a step in the wrong direction, it may not be applicable beyond areas such
as patent claims construction, in which concerns about uniformity
predominate. Cases such as Feltner, Warner-Jenkinson, and even Del Monte
Dunes suggest that the Court has not moved far from the four strands of
traditional Seventh Amendment jurisprudence developed since the 1930s.
That jurisprudence reflects the efforts of the Supreme Court to preserve the
substance of the common law civil jury trial right, while at the same time
adapting practices and procedures to meet modern needs. If the Seventh
Amendment is to continue to provide a valuable guarantee, then the Court's
504 Id. at 1649 (citations omitted).
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evolving jurisprudence must strike a balance between preservation and
change, a balance measured against two centuries' worth of efforts to preserve the jury's critical function-achieving a fair resolution of disputed facts
in an action at law.
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